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1 Introduction  
 
“The Nazification of the enemy, whoever that enemy may be, and the 
transformation of security threats into danger of total annihilation of the 
state, seem to have characterized the way of speech of Israel’s political, 
social, and cultural elites, with very few exceptions.”    
 
This thesis concerns with a specific characteristic of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust in Israel: the revival of Holocaust representations in periods of crises. I 
examine this characterization of Israel’s sense of identity, in contemporary frame 
of references, and explore the transformation of security threats into danger of 
total annihilation of the state (as referred above by Zertal 2005, p.174) through the 
social category of the collective memory of the Holocaust and its representations 
in the Israeli discourse, in relation to Iran. Consequently, the research question that 
has guided this thesis from beginning to end has been:  
How the collective memory of the Holocaust (in Israel) is being revived in 
the current crisis with Iran? 
The Unit of Analysis  
As suggested, this paper concerns with Israel domestically; its identities and 
discourses. However, the scope of this thesis does not allow me to investigate 
Israel’s diverse population, which is marked by cultural, religious, economic, 
political, and social cleavages (Horowitz & Lissak 1989). In the face of these 
divisions, I chose to concentrate on one social category in the Israeli society that 
represents, to some extent, a unifying element of Jewish Israeli society: the legacy 
of the Holocaust.       
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     Works such as the Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, by Tom 
Segev (1993), and Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood, by Idith 
Zertal (2005), have shown that the collective memory of the Holocaust is a 
unifying element of Jewish Israeli sense of unity and common identity. In view of 
that, due to the constitutive role that the Holocaust plays in Israel’s sense of 
common identity, the Israeli society is described, by some, in terms of “culture of 
death” (Zertal 2005)  and mentality of siege (Bar-Tal & Teichman 2005).  
     In this regard, and from the perception that “state’s identity in international 
politics cannot be constructed at home alone- it is only in interaction with a 
particular Other that the meaning of a state is established” (Hopf 2002, p.288), I 
chose to analyze how Israel’s mentality of siege is represented in its interaction 
with a particular Other: the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
The Interaction with a Particular Other  
The following ‘greeting’ was mobilized by the leader of Iran to Israel’s 
celebrations of its sixtieth anniversary:  
 “Look at our region… They [the Western powers] created a dirty black 
microbe called the Zionist regime to set upon the countries in the area like a 
beast of prey.”1  
     The expression “dirty black microbe” is Nazi-oriented expression (“cholera 
microbes” (Dawidowicz 1982, p.58)). It is an age-old expression, which is 
‘borrowed’ from Western sources, producing a symbiosis between European anti-
Semitism and Middle Eastern anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.  
     This statement, adds up to a traditional Holocaust denial by Iran; an obsession 
with the Holocaust of Europe’s Jewry, which can be best illustrated by the current 
conservative regime in Iran. Iran’s President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, began a 
media campaign to cast doubts on Israel’s legitimacy and the significance of the 
Holocaust. That ‘campaign’, began in August 2006, with an exhibition of revolting 
                                                 
1 Terrorism-info.org (accessed: 30.05.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hi_210208e.htm  
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caricatures on the subject of the Holocaust2, and its climax was state sponsor 
conference on the Holocaust, the “International Conference to Review the Global 
Vision of the Holocaust”3, that took place in Teheran in December 2006.  
     Ahmadinejad’s advocacy of Holocaust denial is not a new or uniquely personal 
obsession of one man but an intensification of prevalent themes, in Islamic Iranian 
ideological discourse, and in the Arabic discourse as a whole4. As will be seen 
along the thesis, Iran’s rhetoric; the inclusion of the theme of the Holocaust in 
order to de-legitimize the State of Israel, together with its ongoing nuclear 
program, has contributed to the construction of a very hectic discourse 
domestically in Israel. 
Levels of Analysis 
From the perception that discourses tend to codify the unusual realities into usual 
realities that fit the already existing cultural meanings of a certain society, I aim to 
analyze the possibility in which Israeli politicians (collective agents) frame the 
Iranian issue via symbolic presentations. In other words, I will concentrate on the 
cultural memory of the Holocaust, as a predominant cultural meaning in Israel’s 
Jewish society, and interpret its assumed representations in relation to the Iranian 
issue, via the Israeli political discourse.  
The Assumption 
With my personal acquaintance of the Israeli culture (as a native Israeli), and my 
academic interest in the Israeli society, I suspect that due to the macabre history of 
the Jews (symbolize here by the extermination of Europe Jewry) and the militant 
nature of the State of Israel (in a relatively hostile environment), the Israeli/Jewish 
                                                 
2 Holocaust Cartoon Contest 2006 (accessed: 30.05.2008) [online]. URL - 
http://irancartoon.com/120/holocaust/index.htm  
3 On December 11 and 12, 2006, the Iranian regime hosted a conference dedicated to the Holocaust, called 
the “International Conference on Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision”. The conference was held at the 
Institute for Political and International Studies, in Tehran, which belongs to the Iranian foreign ministry, 
and hosted some of the most notorious Holocaust deniers living today.  
4 See on Middle East anti-Semitism. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) (accessed: 
04.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.memri.org/antisemitism.htm 
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maps of meaning, about the surrounding world, are highly cynical and defensive. 
Consequently, my assumption is that, in accordance with the traditional revival of 
Holocaust-related-themes (in Israel) in periods of crises (as will be presented in 
chapter four), Iran’s maximization of its relevant power, together with its 
compulsive intervention with Israel’s sense of identity, stimulates the memory of 
the Holocaust in the Israeli political discourse, indicating, in return, on its cultural 
traumatic nature.  
Theoretical Justification 
This thesis is inspired by the discipline of interpretive constructivism, where 
scholars such as Gourevitch (2002), Guzzini (2000), Hopf (2002), Neufeld (1993) 
and Wendt & Fearon (2002) all emphasizes that the nature of norms and identities, 
which is originated in the domestic realm, is highly valuable to international level 
understandings. The nature of norms and identities (domestically in Israel) is 
highlighted here by the conception of “collective memory” (Olick and Robbins 
1998). And due to my interest in a hectic collective memory, such as the collective 
memory of the Holocaust, and in order to emphasize how this memory tends to be 
represented in contemporary frame of reference, I will theorize it as a “cultural 
trauma” (Alexander 2004; Assmann and Czaplicka 1995); an “essential trauma of 
Israeli society” (Bar – Tal & Teichman 2005, p.96) that tends to be represented in 
Israel in circumstances of the extreme (periods of crises), implying, in return, on 
its significance to the understandings of Israel’s behaviour in the international 
arena.  
     I am concern with how the memory of the Holocaust symbolically integrating 
in the Israeli political discourse, in regards with a tense international crisis. I seek 
to explain what the discourse says; what the Israeli discourse is, in relation to Iran, 
and how Holocaust-related-themes are being used in this respect. Such an 
explanation will hopefully be in value for better understanding Israel’s sense of 
identity under circumstances of the extreme, and, in more abstract terms, to imply 
 4
how hostile myths may lead to fear of group extinction (Kaufmann 2001) and 
destructively influence the communication in the international realm.  
The structure of the thesis 
The next chapter, chapter two, is the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
Theoretical accounts are given concerning how hostile myths might deteriorate a 
security dilemma (Kaufmann 2001), whereas, due to the destructive nature of this 
sort of communication, the “cutting edge of constructivist research” (Gourevitch 
2002, p.319) is presented as an abstract theoretical conception that highlights the 
need to incorporate society’s identities, and discourses, in the studies of the 
international realm.  
     The objective of this paper is to reveal the construction of reality in the Israeli 
political discourse in regards to the Iranian issue, while as the traumatic memory 
of the Holocaust, uses me as unit of analysis. For that reason, I present the 
sociological theoretical model of “cultural trauma” (Alexander 2004); a hectic 
collective memory that is characterized by its tendency to revive in contemporary 
“frame of reference” (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995, p.130). This cultural 
characterization will later guide me, in the analysis, in order to expose how the 
collective memory of the Holocaust operates, through “speech act theory” 
(Alexander 2004, 11), as an “essential trauma of Israeli society” (Bar – Tal & 
Teichman 2005, p.96). 
     Chapter three outlines the methodological considerations this thesis is founded 
on. Theoretical consideration concerning the “overlapping” and “historical 
continuity” of discourses will be presented and related to my theoretical 
foundations. Whereas, in order to identify how the cultural trauma of the 
Holocaust is communicated in the political Israeli discourse, two associating 
methods, the metaphorical analysis and the narrative analysis, will guide me in the 
analysis of the discourse.  
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     Finally, due to my objective to detect the overlapping characteristics and 
historical continuity of Holocaust representations in today’s political discourse (in 
regard to the Iranian issue), theoretical categories will be drawn from and answer 
the empirical data upon which this study is based. “Abstraction of theory” will 
therefore be of major importance in my interpretation of the discourse. And the 
constitutive Holocaust discourses, which will use me in the interpretation, will be 
presented in chapter four.   
     Chapter four contextualizes the constitutive legacy of the Holocaust in the 
Israeli sense of collectively. It visualizes the traditional revival of Holocaust-
related-themes in periods of crises. And it presents a theoretical account 
concerning the sociocognitive implications of collective trauma domestically in 
Israel. The theoretical accounts that are presented in this context chapter are of 
great magnitude to the thesis. The theoretical framework that is constructed here is 
abstracted and drawn from to interpret the empirical data, in the actual analysis, 
and will hopefully be in practice to validate my theoretical assumption concerning 
the cultural traumatic nature of the collective memory of the Holocaust in Israel 
(its tendency to revive in contemporary frame of reference).      
     Chapter five and six constitute the analysis itself. Chapter five shows through 
indepth metaphorical and narrative interpretation, the historical continuity of 
Holocaust discourses in Israel, by analyzing Israel’s highest authority (the Prime 
Minister) discursive tendency. This description and interpretation of the discourse, 
is followed by chapter six, which explores the stability and strength of the Prime 
Minister political discourse through an interpretation of three more influential 
political figures in the Israeli political sphere.  
     The conclusion, chapter seven, ties the previous chapters together and explains 
how the presented political discourse correlates with my theoretical 
conceptualization of Israel’s cultural trauma, emphasizing, in return, how hostile 
myths may lead to fear of group extinction.   
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The Introduction of New Patterns of Hostilities 
How the Iranian issue is being portrayed by “official Israel”? 
Prior to the theoretical chapter I would like to establish an understanding of how 
Iran is being portrayed by “official Israel”. The official Israeli characterization of 
Iran is portrayed here by the internet site of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs5 
(MFA).  
      The Iranian issue is receiving major attention in the official site of Israel’s 
MFA. It is being titled as the “Iranian threat” and the “threat” reveals around two 
types of anxieties: on the one hand, a physical/materialistic anxiety; which 
concerns with Iran’s “nuclear threat” and its “support of terror”. And on the other 
hand, an identity- related anxiety; which concerns with Iran’s “Holocaust denial” 
and its mobilization of anti-Zionist rhetoric’s. 
     The materialistic section of the “nuclear threat” presents an overview 
concerning Iran's nuclear program (the key developments in uranium enrichment 
and heavy-water technology). It concerns Iran’s development of delivery systems 
(missile abilities) and a discussion of the urgent need, by both the international 
community and Israel, to support and mobilize additional resolutions and 
measures against Iran.  
     The additional materialistic section concerns Iran’s “support of terror”. This 
section reveals official intelligent documents, which, most coherently, portray Iran 
as a “terrorism-sponsoring state”6. It highlights the relationships between 
Hizbullah and Iran; the strategic support of “Palestinian terrorism”7 (by both Iran 
and Syria which are described as members of the same axis); and Iran’s 
                                                 
5 MFA (accessed: 04.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA 
6 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (accessed: 10.06.2008) [online]. URL -   
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_141107e.pdf 




connection to the Buenos-Aires bombings8. In sum, the general argument in the 
“support of terror” section is that, “since Khomeini's rise to power in 1979 Iran has 
maintained aspirations to lead the radical Islamic camp and continues to deepen its 
ties to extremist states and terrorist groups throughout the Middle East”9.     
     Accordingly, “official Israel” clearly portrays Iran as an actor that introduces a 
physical threat to Israel’s existent. The "terrorism weapon" is described as a 
strategic tool by Iran for promoting its national interests - to lead the radical 
Islamic camp against Israel’s existent - and its nuclear program is described as no 
less then a “nuclear threat”. Nevertheless, to my judgment, both of those 
materialistic-physical threats can not be presented as ‘so’ “threatening” without 
the ideological context, which interrelates with them. 
     As an indication, Iran’s President (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) statements (e.g. 
"The countdown for the Zionist regime's destruction began”) are highly noticeable 
in both the “Nuclear threat” and “terror support” sections, and are associated and 
portrayed, by leading Israeli personals, with the probability of an actual physical 
confrontation (e.g. “he has threatened the State of Israel and denied the Holocaust, 
all while Iran ominously develops a military nuclear weapons program”10).   
     I would like to concentrate on this aspect of the communication between the 
actors. The identity-related context of the Israeli Iranian conflict will be the core of 
my research. My aim is to point on the destructive potential that identity issues 
might have on already tense relations of power between two highly militarized 
actors. In order to ‘isolate’ the identity issues, from the wide context of such a 
conflict, the social category of the collective memory of the Holocaust will serve 
                                                 
8 The bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish community center (1994), in Buenos-Aires, 
where hundreds were killed and wounded.  
9 Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (accessed: 10.06.2008) [online]. URL -   
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/iran_hezbollah_e1b.htm 
10 Israel’s Ambassador to the UN (Dan Gillerman) in the U.N. General Assembly (June 6, 2007), following 
Ahmadinejad statement: the “countdown for the destruction of Israel” (accessed: 10.06.2008) [online]. 
URL -  http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israel+and+the+UN/Speeches+-
+statements/Statement+by+Israeli+Amb+Gillerman+to+the+UN+Security+Council+14-Jul-2006.htm 
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me as a field of investigation; for describing the Israeli political discourse 
concerning Iran.  
     And indeed, the conceptualization of the “Iranian threat”, by “official Israel”, 
most distinguishably concentrates on the sensitive theme of the Holocaust. It 
appears in a separate section, under the title “Holocaust denial” (out of three 
sections: “nuclear threat”; “support of terror; and “Holocaust denial”), and is a 
major theme in the communication of Israel’s MFA.       
     In sum, the Iranian issue is officially titled in Israel as the “Iranian threat” and, 
as was illustrated above, the “threat” reveals around two types of threats: a 
‘physical threat’ and an ‘ideological threat’. Apparently, both play a 
communicative role in the contemporary crisis with Iran and, as will be seen along 
the thesis, the associations between hostile rhetoric’s to an actual physical threat 
are constant. I therefore find it crucial to raise questions concerning the 
influencing factors of this communication and, in pursued after my interest in the 
collective memory of the Holocaust, I would like to explore how Holocaust 




2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The physical/materialistic nature of the “Iranian threat”, as portrayed above (Iran’s 
“support of terror” and its “nuclear program”), can be well highlighted and 
presented as the origins of today’s hostility between the two actors (Iran and 
Israel). However, it is of evidence that identity issues also play a role in the Israeli- 
Iranian conflict. Evidently (as portrayed above by Israel’s MFA), hostile rhetoric’s 
and the identity-related-theme of the Holocaust obtain major capacity in Israel’s 
MFA; for describing the “Iranian threat”. It indicates that for fully describing the 
Israeli Iranian conflict identity issues can not be neglected. It (identity issues) is 
part of the explanation of the conflict and, to my opinion; it should be added to the 
established academic tendency to describe the Israeli-Iranian conflict with quantity 
accounts of the relations of power between the sides.        
     In view of that, my aim is to explain, through discourse analysis, how identity 
issues play a role in this conflict as my fundamental concern is with the Israeli 
domestic realm. However, as we saw, materialistic issues (e.g. Iran’s “nuclear 
threat”) do appear in the Israeli discourse concerning Iran, and therefore, I feel 
obligated to open with theoretical accounts that ‘bridge’ between ‘materialistic 
inspired’ and ‘identity inspired’ ontology’s. Those theoretical ‘justifications’ will 
be followed by theoretical sections that will directly relate to my interest in the 
collective memory of the Holocaust as a traumatic cultural memory in the Israeli 
society. 
Identity Inspired Security Dilemma  
According the theorization of the “myth-symbol complex” (Kaufmann 2001, p.25) 
hostile prejudice may be a pre condition for potential violent (between the sides). 
It resemble the conventional Security Dilemma (SD) - where the build-up of 
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defensive/offensive power might create fears and motivate an arm race, whilst the 
factor of opportunity can stimulate actual acts of hostility - only that, according to 
the myth-symbol complex, the weaponry is the mobilization of hostile attitudes; the 
fears are identity fears; and the opportunity can be from an emotionally sporadic 
reaction to a strategic mobilization by predators (Kaufmann 2001, pp.32-36). 
     As argued, “[h]ostile and fear rise as a result of symbolic events that activate 
the myths, such as … a leader explicitly manipulating symbols” (p.34). In return, 
those symbolic events are argued to stimulate “emotional expression” (p.28), in the 
political process, where “people choose by responding to the most emotionally 
potent symbol evoked” (p.28).  
     The description and interpretation of the Israeli discourse, concerning the 
“Iranian threat”, will show that “collective agent” 11 (Alexander 2004, 11), in the 
Israeli Jewish society, responds through emotional expression, to the most 
emotionally potent symbol evoked. The most emotionally potent symbol evoked 
will be signified in this thesis through the memory of the Holocaust, which is 
constantly being evoked by Iran’s current regime. 
     In this respect, Kaufmann (2001, pp.34-36) warns us that hostile myths may 
lead to fear of group extinction and the opportunity to mobilize (in materialistic 
terms) may provoke violence. The likelihood for the eruption of violent between 
Israel and Iran can be only assumed (although that many perceive the dominant 
Shi’a militia in Lebanon (Hizballah) as an Iranian proxy (e.g. Israel’s MFA) 
indicating, in return, on the militarized nature of the conflict between the sides 
(Israel and Iran)). However, a description and interpretation of the emotional 
expression of fear of group extinction can be detected through discourse analysis. 
And indeed, the analysis reveals that, the “Iranian threat” evokes emotional 
expressions of fear of group extinction in the Israeli political discourse.     
                                                 
11 Based on Weber’s definition of the “carrier groups”; agents who are based in particular places in the 
social structure and have the ability to construct “meaning” in the public sphere (Alexander 2004, p.11). 
 12
     In sum, from the gloomy perspective that “very strong hostile myths may need 
very little political opportunity to cause war” (Snyder & Jervis 1999, p.37), an 
interpretation of the emotional expression in the Israeli Iranian discourse might 
hold some academic value.  
Domestic Realm Understanding for International Realm 
Understanding 
As suggested, I do not want to rule out the physical/materialistic nature of the 
Israeli Iranian conflict (more specifically, its influence on the discourse), in view 
of that, I will be guided (in the description of the discourse) by the so called 
“cutting edge of constructivist research” (Gourevitch 2002, p.319). It is a 
supplementary perspective that do not deny crucial materialistic patterns of 
behaviour, which characterized much of the international politics scholarship, but 
do suggests that other variables besides the distribution of military capabilities, 
such as norms and identities, can cause the likelihood of conflict.  
     According to Brooks (1997) a conflict can well depend on the nature of shared 
understandings regarding norms and identities between “actors”12 (Wendt & 
Fearon 2002, p. 63). The nature of norms and identities is originated in the 
domestic realm and therefore, domestic level analysis is regarded as highly 
valuable to international level understandings (p.456). Gourevitch (2002) argues, 
as well, that an interpretation of states behaviour in the international arena 
depends, to some extent, on social and cultural domestic interpretations (pp.315-
316). Such incorporation is argued by Neufeld (1993, p.230) to help and re-
establish the fundamental commonality between institutions regulating interaction, 
in the domestic realm, and institutions regulating interaction, in the system realm. 
     Interpretive social science proposes that states ought to be analyzed 
domestically in such a manner that will uncover their nature of norms and 
                                                 
12 Modern constructivists tend to define major institutions and organizations as actors, because their 
concern with the role of identities construction implying that organization, institutions or states are all 
actors in the formation and construction of identity (Wendt & Fearon 2002, p. 63). 
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identities. Society’s nature of norms and identities can be analyzed in a wide range 
of methodical means and progress our understanding of how the system level is 
actually constructed. Therefore, the realist tradition- with its conceptualization of 
the factors that reshape the balance of power, in the system level (mostly 
materialistic capabilities), can gain much from domestic interpretive methods; 
methods which can help to explain and understand the balance of power as a social 
constructed institution (Neufeld 1993, pp.54-57).  
     However, as suggested, interpretive constructivism is a supplementary 
perspective and it does not deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour, which 
characterized much of the international politics scholarship. Concepts like power 
seeking states are still relevant for our understanding of the international system 
(Neufeld 1993, p.58). In other words, as argued by Guzzini (2000, pp. 159-160), 
interpretive constructivism does not deny the existence of a materialist 
phenomenal world, external to thoughts, but theoretically stresses that practices 
such as norms and identities can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge 
that should therefore be studied for interpretive purpose.  
     My discourse analysis concerns with Israel domestically and wish to uncover 
some aspects of its nature of norms and identities. However, as suggested above, I 
do not deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour, on the contrary, it is of 
evidence that materialistic patterns of behaviour characterize much of the 
interaction between the two actors (Israel and Iran), and most noticeably appear in 
the discourse (e.g. Iran’s “nuclear threat” and Iran’s “threat of terror”). 
Nevertheless, as will be seen, materialistic patterns of behaviour clearly associates 
(in the discourse) with identity-related issues, such as the memory of the 
Holocaust. Therefore, the cutting edge of constructivist research, as presented 
above, which pay much attention on variables such as norms and identities, but do 
not deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour, will hopefully progress our 
understanding of how the international realm is influencing towards a certain 
construction of meaning in the domestic realm and the other way around.  
 14
The Thick Account of Identity 
After explicating the need to incorporate domestic studies of norms and identities 
for better understanding the international realm, the requested question should be: 
how the nature of norms and identities can be detected?  
     It is argued that the study of society’s identity leaves us with a cognitive 
account that according to Hopf (2002) is “thickly inductive and empirical” (p.3). 
Individuals, so it is argued, tend to make the “unfamiliar familiar in terms of the 
identity of the self” (p.6). The complex phenomenon world tends to be 
““categorized” because individuals have a need to understand” (p.6). Collective 
agents fall under the same categorization of individuals because they socialize in a 
certain society and are therefore influenced by the same social categories, which 
constitute society’s collective identity; they, as well, have a need to understand. It 
has been coherently described by Weldes (1999): “state officials [collective 
agents]… approach international politics with an already quite comprehensive and 
elaborate appreciation of the world… rooted in collective meanings already 
produced, at least in part, in domestic political and cultural contexts” (p.9).         
     Consequently, in order to make sense of the social world, and in order to well 
interpret the construction of meaning by collective agents, it is suggested to 
concentrate on social categories that are categorized by individuals in order to 
better make sense of the phenomenon world.     
     Gourevitch (2002) regards those empirical social categories as “predominates 
normative orientation of the society” (pp. 318-319) and ‘luckily’ enough my target 
of investigation, Israel, is prosperous with predominate normative orientations 
(relating to its tragic past and present). Hopefully, through focusing on explicit 
predominate normative orientation, such as the collective memory of the 
Holocaust, I will be able to expose how specific norms and identities are being 
constructed and instrumentalized in the current crisis with Iran. And more 
specifically, how the collective memory of the Holocaust, which is a 
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comprehensive and elaborate collective meaning in Israeli society, is being 
constructed by collective agents in the current crisis with Iran.  
The Interaction with the ‘Other’ 
It has been suggested by Hopf (2002, p.278) that, “domestic society, its identities, 
discourses, and relationships to the state, must be brought back into any 
constructivist account of world politics”. However, “state’s identity in 
international politics cannot be constructed at home alone- it is only in interaction 
with a particular Other that the meaning of a state is established” (p.288). In view 
of that, Israel will be analyzed domestically (its identities and discourses) in direct 
relation to its interaction with a particular Other: the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
And Hopefully, Hopf’s (2002) assumption, that the communication between actors 
and the exchange of knowledge, yet alone, might result with a construction of 
meaning (pp.288-290), will be validated, in my empirical study, and expose how 
the communication between Israel and Iran is influencing towards a specific 
construction of meaning; the revival of the social category of the collective 
memory of the Holocaust. 
The Stimulated Frame of Time by a Particular Other 
Due to my interest in how the social category of the Holocaust operates in periods 
of crises, I will concentrate on how it is been emotionally expressed, in the Israeli 
political discourse, in relation to Iran’s mobilized rhetoric’s (towards Israel), 
which uses me, in return, as a sort of ‘manipulator’ that ‘stimulates’ a certain 
construction of meaning in Israel.  
     Inspired by a particular interest in the memory of the Holocaust and 
Kaufmann’s theorization that: [h]ostile and fear rise as a result of symbolic events 
that activate the myths, such as … a leader explicitly manipulating symbols, I 
would like to construct my research in relation to a very specific event, which can 
be well regarded as a symbolic event. A symbolic event that apparently stimulates 
‘rhetoric warfare’ between Iran and Israel: 
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The Holocaust convention (the “International Conference to Review the Global 
Vision of the Holocaust”) was a two-day conference held in Tehran, December 
11-12, 2006, and is referred by “official Israel” as a “Holocaust denial 
conference”13. This event is perceived by me as a symbolic event because symbols 
(such as the Holocaust) were clearly manipulated there, activating, in return, 
certain myths in Israel.  
 
The “Holocaust convention” sparked and still sparks a great deal of Iranian-
related-discourses in Israel. For that reason, I decided to center my research on the 
months previous to the convention, but after the known-about of its expected 
occurrence; a frame time of four months, from September 12, 2006 to December 
12, 2006, where I describe and interpret the emotional magnitude of the Israeli 
political discourse, which related, explicitly or implicitly, to the social category of 
the Holocaust.      
 
In sum, an identity-inspired domestic investigation was presented as thickly 
inductive and empirical and as crucial for better understanding international 
phenomena. In this respect, the social category of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust will be described as a predominant cultural category in the domestic 
Israeli realm and its employment, by collective agents, in the discourse, in relation 
to the “Iranian threat”, will be describe and interpreted. Hopefully, such an 
identity inspired investigation will contribute for our understanding of the Israeli 
domestic realm, and for the understanding of the Israeli Iranian crisis. 
The Constitutive Role of Memory  
The French sociologist Halbwaches coined the term “collective memory” (Olick & 
Robbins 1998, p.109). He argued that individuals remember only in the social 
context and memory is an act of social construction. Such definition opened the 
way to the study of memory as a social phenomenon.  
                                                 
13 As portrayed in Israel’s MFA (accessed: 04.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA   
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     Collective memory plays a fundamental role in the notion of social identity, 
since it “concerns how we acquire our personal and social identities” (Olick & 
Robbins 1998, p.122) and since it is “a central, if not the central, medium through 
which identities are constituted” (p.133). It is an extension from the traditional 
perception of identity - in psychological individualist terms - to the collective 
understanding of how identities are being formulated; how identity works in the 
social level; and how symbolic dimensions of culture, such as norms and values, 
influence the social process (p.108).  
     Communities are argued to constitute their identities in accordance with their 
history. In view of that, the study of collective memory seeks to reveal how the 
past is being retold and how the present narrative is being constructed. It examines 
community’s constitutive narrative of the past as “it raises questions about the 
transmission, preservation, and alteration of these frameworks over time” (Olick & 
Robbins 1998, p.108). The constitutive role that collective memory plays in a 
community applies also to the mere complex community of the nation-state, which 
“despite internal divisions along generational, regional, religious, and other lines, 
has often claimed to be the primary form of organizing social identity” (Olick & 
Robbins 1998, p.123).  
     In this respect, in view of the constitutive role of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust in Israel and its traditional revival in periods of crises (as will be 
presented in chapter four), the goal of this thesis is to detect the symbolic 
dimension of the memory of the Holocaust as a ‘fixed’ cultural memory in the 
Israeli Jewish society and how it is being formulated in relation to an international 
crisis (the Iranian crisis). I would like to raise questions concerning the 
transmission, preservation, and alteration of the memory of the Holocaust over 
time and in relation to a contemporary crisis. Does the collective memory of the 
Holocaust is still the central medium through which identities are constituted, 
domestically in Israel, in periods of crises?   
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     As suggested, the collective memory plays a fundamental role in the notion of 
social identity since it is constituted by powerful symbolic dimensions of culture 
that are based on historic events. However, it is a wide definition that falls under 
the enormous field of the construction of national identity, by the nation state, and 
therefore; it is suggested (in methodological terms) to “specify at a more middle 
level how memory processes operate within specific social institutions” (Olick & 
Robbins 1998, p.122). Such a “middle level”, in my regards, is the collective 
memory of the Holocaust as a ‘fixed’ cultural memory in the Israeli Jewish society 
and how it operates within specific social institution in the Israeli domestic realm; 
specific social institution that is characterized here by the discursive tendency of 
the Israeli political sphere.  
The Cultural Perception of Memory 
In relation to the presented above I find the conception of the “cultural memory” 
as instrumental for my purpose of locating and explaining the constitutive role that 
collective memories might play in the construction of meaning. The cultural 
memory is a collective concept that is embedded in the societal practice as a 
whole, on the rituals, texts and images by which societies interpret their past. It 
seeks to explore how the past shapes society’s customs and values and it does so 
by a “cultural-topological interest” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, p.133). In other 
words, it concentrates on the relation between memory and culture. It is originated 
in culturalist interactions and can be best illustrated in contrast to the everyday 
communications of the “communicative memory” (pp.125-126). 
     The communicative memory is described as the wide range of everyday 
communications. It is the everyday communications of memories that are 
mediating between individuals and groups. Every group is communicating through 
intimate collective memories that are originated in the group history, and 
subsequently; a “common image” of the community past is being constructed 
(Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, pp.126-127). However, such everyday 
 19
communications are “characterized by a high degree of nonspecialization, 
reciprocity of roles, thematic instability, and disorganize” (p.126). Accordingly, 
there is a constant shift of images and even though that the common images are 
based on history, the “horizon” of the collective memories (as represented by the 
communicative memory) “does not extend more than eighty to (at the vary most) 
one hundred years into the past” (p.127). The shift of collective memories is 
argued to occur in direct relation to the passing of time. And in specific relevance 
to my line of interest, the everyday communication of collective memories is 
instable because it “offers no fixed point which would bind it to the ever 
expanding past in the passing of time” (p.127). As suggested, it is precisely the 
fixed cultural frames and discourses (in the Israeli society) that I seek to detect. 
     It was argued, in this respect, that “fixity can only be achieved through a 
cultural formation and therefore [the fixity of the cultural memory] lies outside of 
informal everyday memory” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, p.127). 
     Accordingly, I would like to adopt Assmann and Czaplicka’s (1995) 
theorization of the cultural memory - a historical memory that is constant in time 
and cultural by nature - and apply it to the collective memory of the Holocaust; 
because, as suggested, my interest is in the fixed normative orientations of Israel’s 
society. I am interested in the collective memory of the Holocaust which is a fixed 
common image in the Israeli Jewish society; a collective memory that is a “master 
commemorative narrative”14 (Zerubavel 1997, p.6) in Israel’s Jewish society and, 
as will be seen, a collective memory that is functioning as a historical memory 
with fixed cultural form that marks Israel society emergence as an independent 
social entity, and influencing, in return, on the group’s sense of common identity 
and culture.      
                                                 
14 A “master commemorative narrative” is an event that marks the group’s emergence as an independent 
social entity (Zerubavel 1997, p.6). It is a commemorative narrative that assists in portraying the group as a 
distinct unit vis-à-vis others and is typically reinforced by the “annual calendar, and the liturgical cycle 
[which] typically disrupt the flow of time by highlighting recurrent patterns in the group’s experiences” 
(p.7). Such is the Holocaust that, as will be seen, received the most symbolic place in Israel’s annual 
calendar.   
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     Further more, it is argued that “fateful events of the past” (Assmann & 
Czaplicka 1995, p.129) are the exact kind of collective memories that might be 
interpreted as cultural memories and that collective memories of fateful events 
tends to revive and reproduce in contemporary terms. Does the fateful event of the 
Holocaust is being reproduce in contemporary terms?  
     The capacity of the collective memory of the Holocaust to reconstruct itself in 
contemporary “frame of reference” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, p.130) will 
indicate on its cultural origin and help to theorize my assumption concerning the 
revival of Holocaust-related-themes in the current crisis with Iran.    
      In sum, the cultural memory (as a sub theory of the collective memory 
discipline) will hopefully be in assistant for describing how the historical memory 
of the Holocaust has been constructed towards a fixed cultural heritage, 
domestically in Israel, and how it is being revived in contemporary frame of 
reference (in relation to the Iranian crisis). Moreover, the interpretation of the 
cultural heritage of the memory of the Holocaust, domestically in Israel, will 
hopefully indicate on certain constituted norms and values in the Israeli society; 
constituted norms and values that, as will be seen next, are rotted in cultural 
trauma.   
The Traumatic Perception of Memory 
As suggested above, the fateful event of the past - the Holocaust of European 
Jewry - will be presented as fixed cultural formation for explaining some aspects 
in Israel’s “area of objectivised culture” (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995, p.127). I 
would like next to expand this culturalist perception with the sociological 
theoretical model of “cultural trauma” (Alexander 2004), which was constructed 
through case studies such as the Holocaust, the slavery in the U.S., and September 
11. According to the theoretical model of cultural trauma, when members of a 
certain society feel that they have been subjected to a “horrendous event” 
(Alexander 2004, p.1) not only that this event will be highly representative in 
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society’s sense of collectively it will also tend to be associated with contemporary 
events.        
     Accordingly, the collective memory of the Holocaust is argued to be an 
“essential trauma of Israeli society” (Bar – Tal & Teichman 2005, p.96). Not only 
that the memory of the Holocaust took an identity constitutive role in the process 
of Israel’s state building it also operates as a major narrative in Israel’s society in 
contemporary frame of reference. As suggested by Bar-Tal & Teichman (2005, 
p.96):  
“The trauma of the Holocaust leaves an indelible mark on the national 
psychology, the tenor and content of public life, the conduct of foreign 
affairs, on politics, education, literature and the arts”.  
     As suggested above; will be further presented in chapter four; and tested in the 
analysis chapters, the representation of the collectivist trauma of the Holocaust in 
the Israeli society is of clear evidence; indicating, in return, on its traumatic nature 
(the Holocaust… the tenor and content of public life). 
     Moreover, following the theorization that cultural trauma tends to be associated 
with contemporary events (contemporary events that are symbolized, following 
the traumatic experience of the past, as a fundamental threat to society’s 
existence), we will clearly see (in chapter four) that contemporary threats to Israel 
were traditionally symbolized (in the political discourse in Israel) as fundamental 
threats to society’s existence. In view of that, the goal of this study is to explore 
this ‘traditional tendency’ in the most contemporary terms - In relation to the 
current crisis with Iran.  
The Incorporation of Trauma in the Speech      
Both the representation and the revival of cultural trauma in contemporary terms 
are explained by the “speech act theory” (Alexander 2004, 11). It is a process in 
where a collective agent communicates with his/her audience (members of the 
carrier group) in a symbolic terminology, which implicitly or explicitly relates to 
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a traumatic event of the past. By so doing, a well manipulated and mediated 
traumatic historic event, which is already culturally constructed and established in 
society’s structure of meaning, might transform toward a “new master narrative” 
(p.12) and enter “into the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity” (pp. 
10-12).  
     In other words, collective agents are argued to reconstruct the trauma claim in 
contemporary terms. I will tend to follow the theorization of the speech act theory, 
in the analysis chapters, in order to identify if the collective memory of the 
Holocaust, which is culturally constructed and established in Israel’s structure of 
meaning, is manipulated and mediated by collective agents to explain a 
contemporary phenomenon. Do collective agents (in Israel) reconstruct the trauma 
claim of the Holocaust in relation to the current crisis with Iran?  
Summary 
It was argued that hostile attitudes might evoke emotional expressions of fear of 
group extinction and destructively influence a SD. From this perception I decided 
to theoretically ‘justify’ why the international arena depends, to some extent, on 
social and cultural domestic interpretations. However, as presented in the 
introduction to the “Iranian threat”, materialistic patterns of behavior characterize 
much of the interaction between Israel and Iran and consequently, cconcepts like 
power seeking states are relevant for the understanding of the discourse of this 
international phenomenon.    
     Accordingly, I presented the so called cutting edge of constructivist research, 
which pay much attention on variables such as norms and identities but do not 
deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour. It is a theoretical paradigm that 
will hopefully progress our understanding of how the international realm is 
influencing towards a certain construction of meaning in the domestic realm or the 
other way around. 
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     Society’s identity is thickly inductive and empirical (due to the categorization 
of the reality by individuals). I chose, in this regard, to concentrate on the social 
category of the Holocaust; a social category that can symbolize the emotional-led 
interaction between Israel and Iran.   
     Moreover, due to the nature of this social category, domestically in Israel, the 
manipulation of it, by Iran, might evoke, as described by Kaufmann, emotional 
expressions of fear of group extinction. Does Iran’s manipulation of the memory 
of the Holocaust (as symbolized by the “Holocaust convention”) evoke emotional 
expressions of fear of group extinction in the Israeli political discourse?  
     The tendency of this collective memory, in the Israeli society, to reconstruct, 
objectivised, and communicated, in contemporary terms (as presented by the 
speech act theory) will validate my characterization of the collective memory of 
the Holocaust as a cultural trauma, in the Israeli society, and will justify, to my 
opinion, the need to incorporate identity-related researches in international studies.      
     In other words, as will be presented, the collective memory of the Holocaust 
represents the ultimate painful injury to the Israeli collectivity. Therefore, I 
presented theoretical accounts that concern with cultural trauma. If, indeed, the 
collective memory of the Holocaust will be detected in the discourse, as a theme 
that is being repeatedly reconstructed in contemporary frame of reference, than, 
my assumption, concerning the cultural trauma of the Holocaust in Israel, will be 
validated; implying, in more general terms, concerning the need to incorporate 
identity studies in the field of international relations. To my opinion, the 
incorporation of cultural trauma in Israel’s sense of identity might destructively 
influence its behaviour in the international arena. Israel’s behaviour in the 
international arena will be specified in this thesis through its political 






As suggested above, my concern is with fixed cultural discourses in the Israeli 
society. A construction of meaning through fixed cultural narratives that might 
influence, in return, on society’s sense of common identity and culture. The 
cultural memory of the Holocaust will be presented in such tendency; a traumatic 
historical memory that is constant in time and cultural by nature and is influencing 
to a large extent on Israel’s sociocognitive perception.  
     Accordingly, my objective is to describe and interpret how such traumatic 
historical memory might be associated with a contemporary “threat”. Does the 
traditional tendency to associate contemporary threats with the existential 
experience of the Holocaust (as will be presented in chapter four) can be verified 
in regards with the current crisis with Iran? And if so, what are the constitutive 
meanings of the constructed discourses?  
     In order to account those inquiries, the analysis will be focused, first of all, on 
detecting a historical continuity regarding the traditional tendency of the memory 
of the Holocaust to appear in periods of crises. Secondly, through abstraction of 
theory, I will interpret the discourse with regards to the constitutive origins of the 
Holocaust discourses. And finally, the analysis will be guided by the metaphor and 
the narrative analysis, which will be in assistance for locating the fixed cultural 
meanings in the text, as they are constructed by collective agents.  
The Historical Continuity 
The historical tendency of Holocaust-related-themes to revive (domestically in 
Israel) in periods of crises is of major concern in this study. Because, the tendency 
of a memory to reconstruct itself in contemporary frame of reference, not only 
points on the stability of the discourse, but also indicates on its traumatic cultural 
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origin. Can this tendency be detected in today’s crisis with Iran? Can a historical 
continuity (in the discourse) be detected? 
     Those inquiries will be approached in chapter four, with a presentation of the 
historical tendency of Holocaust-related-themes to dominant the discourse in 
periods of crises. Chapter four (‘the Cultural Context of the Holocaust’) will be 
presented prior to the analysis chapters, in order to demonstrate the extent of this 
social phenomenon in Israel, and to verify later (through the actual analysis) if, 
indeed, the historical tendency of Holocaust-related-themes to revive in periods of 
crisis “overlap” (Milliken 1999, p.234) in today’s discursive tendency.  
     In other words, the stability of the discourse, and the assumed historical 
continuity of the discourse, will be tested in an analysis of a contemporary 
political discourse.  
The Abstraction of Theory 
Abstraction of theory, “in the sense that theoretical categories are drawn from and 
answer to the empirical data upon which a study is based” (Milliken 1999, p.234), 
is commonly used in discourse analysis. Due to my tendency to detect overlapping 
characteristics and historical continuity of a certain discourse, abstraction will be 
of major importance in my interpretation of the discourse.  
     Two sets of theoretical categories will be constructed, in order to interpret the 
empirical content: the first set of theoretical categories regards the constitutive role 
of the memory of the Holocaust in Israel’s sense of identity, and the second set of 
theoretical categories regards the sociocognitive implications (domestically in 
Israel) from the cultural trauma of the Holocaust. Both sets, of theoretical 
categories, will be constructed in chapter four and later be drawn (abstracted) for 
better interpreting the empirical data. 
     Following my interest in the fixed cultural nature of the Holocaust memory, and 
how it integrates in the hegemonic discourse in circumstances of the extreme 
(periods of crises), the first set of theoretical categories (the constitutive Holocaust 
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discourses), will briefly describe the origins of the two constituting Holocaust 
discourses in Israel: the constitutive narrative of power and renewal and the 
constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial. Those constituting discourses will be 
abstracted for the interpretation of the content and will hopefully be in assistance 
to emphasize the instrumental logic of the memory of the Holocaust and the 
stability of the discourse. 
     The second set of theoretical categories (the sociocognitive implications), will 
include the categorization of Israel’s society in terms of “culture of death”, and 
“siege mentality”, and will hopefully be in value for implying concerning the 
assumed implications that such cultural trauma might have on Israel’s behavior in 
the international realm.  
     Moreover, the method of abstraction will be of help also in validation regards. 
It was argued that: “[a]n analysis can be said to be complete [validated] when 
upon adding new texts and comparing their object spaces, the researcher finds 
consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated work for those texts” 
(Milliken 1999, p.234). Accordingly, throughout my interpretation, of 
contemporary empirical data, I will explore the consistently between theoretical 
categories and the empirical data. If indeed a consistently exist it will support my 
assumptions regarding the revival of Holocaust anxieties in the current crisis with 
Iran. 
The Metaphorical and Narrative Analysis  
The essence of my interpretations, as suggested above, will surround around the 
overlapping of discourses, for showing the historical continuity of the discourse in 
periods of crises, and around the abstraction of theory, for interpreting the 
instrumental logic of the memory of the Holocaust; the stability of the discourse; 
and for implying concerning the sociocognitive implications of such a memory on 
Israel’s society. Nevertheless, in order to locate the relevant content from the text 
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two associating methods - the metaphorical analysis and the narrative analysis - 
will guide me in the analysis of the discourse.   
     According to the metaphorical analysis leading metaphors that repeatedly 
appear in the content can be represented as hegemonic discourses with fix 
dominant meanings. In other words, the attention in the analysis will be directed 
towards “metaphors used regularly in the language practices of a group or society 
to make sense of the world” (Milliken 1999, p.235).   
     The concentration on hegemonic discourses, with fix dominant meanings, is 
appropriate for my descriptive objectives. Descriptive objectives that are 
orientated in revealing and interpreting metaphors that are rooted in fix dominant 
meanings of the Israeli society (represented here by the collective memory of the 
Holocaust) and appear in the Israeli discourse concerning the current crisis with 
Iran.  
       Moreover, in accordance with the already presented speech act theory it is 
argued that, collective agents tend to construct and codified understanding of the 
‘real world’ in a way that will fit already existing cultural meanings, because, the 
framing of an issue will easily make sense “to the extent that it can be situated 
within ‘a range of known social and cultural identifications’ or ‘maps of meaning’ 
about the social world” (Allen 2004, p. 81). Such theoretical perception sharpens 
the understanding that a constructed discourse may be guided by culturalist-
symbolic reasoning and it logically suggests that narratives might play a crucial 
role in the construction of meaning and the retelling of history by collective 
agents.  
     From such a perception the narrative approach is a practical methodological 
tool for investigation. The narrative approach calls to linguistically interpret 
rhetoric’s as “cultural stories” (Silverman 2003, p.345); cultural stories that fit the 
available and familiar narratives of the society (Cottle 2003, pp.344-346). In 
accordance with my motivation to validate the assumption, concerning the cultural 
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traumatic origins of the collective memory of the Holocaust, I find this approach 
as a practical tool.  
     The interpretation of texts, as cultural stories, will point on hegemonic 
discourses that with their fix dominant meanings will help to reveal the nature of 
the symbolic terminology that, implicitly or explicitly, being used by collective 
agents in their construction of meaning concerning the Iranian issue.  
Summary 
As presented, the construction of meaning is best successful if it is mobilized by 
metaphors and narratives, which relate to the audience cultural meanings. In view 
of that, my goal is to reveal the emotional magnitude of this sort of 
communication. I will therefore explore the historical continuity and the stability 
of the discourse over time and interpret it (through abstraction) in accordance with 
constituting theories that will emphasize and reveal the instrumental logic of the 
discourse, and the fix dominant meanings of the discourse; a discourse which is 
constructed by collective agents as cultural stories that fit the available and 
familiar narratives of the society.  
     I presented above three methodological tools (the historical continuity, the 
abstraction of theory and the metaphorical/narrative analysis) that will hopefully 
be in assistance for detecting and stressing the cultural and symbolic 
representation of the collective memory of the Holocaust in the Israeli discourse 
concerning Iran.  
The Data Sets 
The memory of the Holocaust uses me as a social category for explaining the 
Israeli political discourse in regards with the current crisis with Iran. I construct 
two data sets, in two analysis chapters, and, in consistency with the presented 
objectives of the thesis, I relate only to fragments of the texts that directly relate to 
the Iranian issue and to the social category of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust.   
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     The first data set concentrates on the official political discourse as it is 
constructed by Israel’s highest authority (Israel’s Prime Minister). I will open in 
the first analysis chapter with an indepth analysis of three speeches by Israel’s 
Prime Minister (PM). 
     The second data set describes the discursive tendency by three more influential 
politicians (Israel’s opposition Leader; Israel’s vice premier; and Israel’s minister 
of foreign affairs). I will analyze in this chapter the stability of the discourse (as it 
was constructed by the PM) through the communication of those influential 
political figures.      
The Content 
Except of official Israeli internet sites, such as the PM official governmental site 
and the already presented MFA site, I will use the internet versions of two of the 
leading newspapers in Israel: Yedioth Aharonoth and Haaretz.  
 
Haaretz is a privately daily newspaper in Israel that was founded in 1919. 
Haaretz newspaper is commonly regarded as “[s]ecular, liberal, pluralistic, and 
leftist in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Zertal 2005, p.218) and is 
“considered to be the Israeli intelligentsia’s newspaper” (218).     
 
Yedioth Aharonoth is also privately owned newspaper (there is no state owned 
newspaper in Israel) that was founded in 1939. And unlike Haaretz (or at least the 
‘image’ of Haaretz as intelligentsia’s newspaper) Yedioth Aharonoth is 
considered to be a nationalistic orientated newspaper that represents “populist 
attitudes” (Zertal 2005, p.222) in the Israeli public.  
 
Fortunately, the ever more popular internet versions of those media institutions 
assist me, to a great extent, in terms of accessibility and in terms of language. 
Nearly all of the content, which is originally published in Hebrew (Heb.), is 
accessible in archives and in the English language (in the English versions of the 
newspapers internet sites). Thus, the translation issue is ‘objectivised’ to some 
degree, and to what it counts: as a native Hebrew speaker, I can verify that the 
content is well translated and not biased.  
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4 The Cultural Context of the Holocaust  
The Constitutive Legacy of the Holocaust Discourse 
“The Holocaust and its millions of dead have been ever-present in Israel 
from the day of its establishment and the link between the two events 
remains indissoluble. The Holocaust has always been present in Israel's 
speech and silences; in the lives and nightmares of hundreds of thousands 
of survivors who have settled in Israel, and in the crying absence of the 
victims; in legislation, orations, ceremonies, courtrooms, schools, in the 
press, poetry, gravestone inscriptions, monuments, memorial books. 
Through a dialectical process of appropriation and exclusion, 
remembering and forgetting, Israeli society has defined itself in relation to 
the Holocaust”   
 
In accordance with the theorization of the cultural memory we can clearly see, as 
cited above (Zertal 2005, p.3), that the collective memory of the Holocaust is 
culturally embedded in Israel’s societal practice, on its rituals, texts and images by 
which it interpret its past. I would like to concentrate here on a narrower and 
relevant field of research: the constitutive legacy of the Holocaust discourse and 
its traditional tendency to revive in periods of crises. 
     As an introduction to the constitutive legacies Holocaust discourses, which will 
be portrayed next by the two constituting discourses of the Holocaust in Israel, I 
would like to briefly present one of the most dominant institutional mechanism, 
used by the State of Israel, for constructing a Holocaust related common identity:         
Israel’s “Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day” is an annual 
commemoration day that was formulated under a parliamentary law (1959) 
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and through a highly symbolic location in Israel’s annual calendar15 marks 
“the entire story of Israel’s national rebirth, drawing on a potent 
combination of religious and national mythologies” (Zertal 2005, p.39). The 
Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day constructs explicit narratives and 
discourses: “[o]n the one hand, it was meant to remind Jews in Israel and 
the Diaspora of the fate awaiting those who failed to choose the Zionist 
path. On the other, it was intended to emphasize the direct causal link 
between… physical heroism and taking up arms and the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Israel, a modern secular salvation, as it were, and a triumph 
over the history of the Diaspora” (Zertal 2005, pp.39-40) .  
     As portrayed above, the memory of the Holocaust is a master commemorative 
narrative in Israel. It is reinforced by the annual calendar and it marks Israel’s 
emergence as an independent social entity vis-à-vis the defenceless legacy of the 
Diaspora Jews. In order to better understand the fixed cultural nature of such a 
narrative, and how it integrants in the state hegemonic discourse in circumstances 
of the extreme (periods of crises), I will briefly describe next two of the 
constituting Holocaust discourses in Israel: the legacy of the power and renewal 
narrative and the constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial.  
First Discourse: Power and Renewal 
During the first years of Israel’s state-building the state narrative was such of 
“power and renewal” (Zertal 2005 p.94) and the 300,000 refugees and survivors, 
that arrived to Israel (between 1945 and 1955) each with his or her experience 
from Nazi occupied Europe, received minimum support from the establishment to 
share their memories in the public sphere; they were ‘forced’ to join the narrative 
construction of the heroic “new Jew” while keeping their victimization hidden 
from the public eyes (pp.94-95).   
                                                 
15 The 30’Th of April (in Hebrew calendar: The 27 of Nissan) is located between Passover (an ancient 
Jewish religious feast that marks and symbolizes the Jewish exodus ‘from slavery to freedom’ (from 
ancient Egypt)), and the Independence Day (a secular modernist commemoration day that marks the 
establishment of Israel). 
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     Such was the constitutive discourse of power and renewal in the first fifteen 
years of Israel’s existence: on the one hand, the event of the Holocaust has been 
adapted instrumentally by “official Israel” as explicit evidence to the correctness 
of the core ideology of Zionism. The extermination of Europe Jewry became one 
of the legitimating arguments for national Jewish independence and a major 
argument in Israel’s official propaganda concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict 16 
(Shapira 1997, p.93). On the other hand, the absolute victimhood, as represented 
by the Holocaust, was presented by the discourse as the defeated legacy of the 
“old Jews” who went “like sheep to the slaughter”17 (Yablonka 2001, p.247) and 
as a counter-metaphor to the constituting narrative of power and renewal; a 
narrative that was constructed by the mythological figure of the heroically “new 
Jew”18. 
     There is a structural paradox in the ability of Israel to construct victorious 
frame of power and renewal from a horrific defeat such as the Holocaust. Zertal‘s 
(2005, ch.1) interpretation of “the theory of death”19 (p.26) may help to clarify the 
structural paradox of this discourse. The theory of death was a Zionist narrative (in 
the constituting years of state-building) and it presented two kinds of “deaths”: a 
“beautiful death” (p.26) and a death “which is in no way beautiful” (p.26). The 
Jewish uprising against the Nazis in ghetto Warsaw20 was described as a heroic 
beautiful death, by the Zionist establishment, and has been paralyzed to the Zionist 
                                                 
16 The discourse linked between Nazism and anti-Zionist Arabic propaganda.  
17 The expression “went like sheep to the slaughter” is a commonly accusation, in Israel, in the constituting 
years of “power and renewal”, that was used in order to describe the millions of dead of the ghettos and 
concentration camps who did not chose the path of resistance (Yablonka 2001, pp.247-257).   
18 The conception of the “new Jew” was shaped as a result of European Zionists frustration from the rise of 
anti-Semitism in Europe; a frustration that led to the core Zionists ideology concerning the right of self 
determination for Jews (Shapira 1997, p.155). It began as a metaphorical symbol in the popular culture of 
Zionist literature and poetry and quickly enough became a lading ideological and political conception 
(pp.158-175). In the years of state-building it associated with the ‘rough’ metaphorical image of the native 
Israeli (the “Saber”); took part in the narrative of “power and renewal”; and was presented as an antithesis 
to the exilic “old Jew” of the Diaspora, which suffered the consequences of Auschwitz. 
19 The “theory of death” is a manifest that was written in May 20, 1943 by Yitzhak Lufban in Ha’poel 
Ha’tzir (a hegemonic Zionist newspaper in Palestine). 
20 The Warsaw uprising is described as a “huge, enormously portentous event… the most extensive and 
important Jewish military endeavor, and the first mass rebellion in any of the occupied countries, in fact the 
largest direct rebellion in the annals of Nazi dominion” (Zertal 2005, p.27). 
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struggle in Palestine: “[w]e fought here and they fought there” (p.26) (as referred 
to by the Palmach21 commander Yitzhak Sadeh). The rebels have been coded as 
the Zionist Jews of the Diaspora in contrast to the Diaspora “old Jews”, which 
were coded as those who went “like sheep to the slaughter” (pp. 25-38). In other 
words, the uncommon historical event of a Jewish upraise against their Nazis 
perpetrators was instrumentalized as a Zionist narrative and became a myth.  
     In more general terms, the concept of “victim-community” (Zertal 2005, p.2) 
can help to explain a phenomenon in where an absolute defeat can be coded in a 
victorious frame. It is a sociocognitive theorization that is based on a structural 
paradox. The sociocognitive consciousness (from the term victim-community) is 
based on the humiliation of being a victim, however, paradoxically; “the victim is 
always both victim and victor, always destroyed but always reborn in a form that 
overcomes the victimizer” (Zertal 2005, p.2). Accordingly, the humiliation of the 
Holocaust was coded in the discourse of power and renewal as a source of 
heroically common destiny; from the ashes of defeat and humiliation the Zionist 
nationalistic movement was reborn presenting a new form of existence, a more 
dignity sense of existence that overcame and confronted the perpetrator 
(victimizer), and as will be seen, along the thesis, the perception of the perpetrator 
is traditionally being instrumentalized and coded, by the Israeli establishment, in 
relation to time and place and in relation to the legacy of the Holocaust.       
     In sum, the Holocaust used as a legitimized excuse for the establishment of the 
state of Israel, in both the internal and external political fronts (Shapira 1997, 
p.96), however, the personal memories of victimhood and the personal stories of 
horrors – of hundreds of thousands of survivors and refugees – were silenced by 
“official Israel”, and did not take place in the public discourse. Such was the 
Israeli discourse in its first years of existence all until the Eichmann trial. 
                                                 
21 The Palmach was a “[s]trike force within the Haganah, founded in 1941 in order to activate the 
organization’s profile and participate in the war effort against Nazi Germany… and thus became the 
symbol of the Jewish-Zionist new type of man/woman” (Zertal 2005, p.221).   
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Second Discourse: the Eichmann Legacy  
The dominant Israeli leader (Ben-Gurion), which share responsibility for the 
cynical political instrumentilzation of the memory of the Holocaust (as briefly 
presented above), is the same person who is responsible22 for the prosecuting of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem in 196123; a trial that is commonly described as the most 
crucial event in the construction of the Holocaust as the uniting myth of Israel’s 
identity (Levy & Sznaider 2002; Segev 1993; Shapira 1997; Shapira 2007; 
Yablonka 2001; Zertal 2005).  
     As described by Segev (1993, pp.327) many saw the kidnapping, prosecuting 
and execution of Eichmann as a victory in Israel’s existential struggle, and indeed; 
Ben-Gurion himself presented the trial (in interviews and public appearances 
during the year of the trial) as a triumph to Israel’s sovereignty, since it is not 
Eichmann the ‘person’ that is standing to trial but the all episode of the Holocaust, 
and it is standing to trial in Jerusalem. Moreover, the objectives of the trial 
(according to Ben-Gurion) were first of all, to remind the international community 
that the Holocaust is obligating them to support the only Jewish state on the face 
of this earth. And secondly, the presentation of the Holocaust horrors, through the 
trial, meant to insert the memory of the Holocaust in Jewish youth and in the 
oriental Jews (who did not experience the Holocaust).  
     Along the thesis I will tend to focus on Ben-Gurion’s first objective of the trial; 
the tendency to justify Israel’s relevant power with an appeal to the world 
conscience; an ‘appeal’ that was mobilized through a sense of ‘blame’ to the 
‘beaten conscience of the world’. According to Yablonka (2001, p.255), supported 
with the horrifying testimonies of Holocaust survivors, the indictment of the 
Israeli court of law (in the Eichmann trial) was directed not only against Nazi 
Germany but against occupied Europe, as a whole, and against the rest of the 
                                                 
22  Ben-Gurion was described as the “architect, director, and stage manager” (Zertal 2005, p.96) of the trial. 
23 Eichmann was a high rank SS officer that was kidnapped by Israeli Mossad agents, from his place of hide 
in Argentina, and prosecuted, in Israel, as one of the master minds of the “final solution” (Segev 1993, p. 
324).   
 35
international community. Not only that they did not try to save the Jews they even 
disrupt and sabotage rescue attempts, initiated by Zionist organizations. Evidently, 
Ben-Gurion repeatedly blamed France, Great-Britain and U.S. for not saving Jews. 
While doing so, Israel’ PM associated the annihilation of Jews with the passive 
resistance of the world to those massive acts of ethnic cleansing (Yablonka 2001, 
p.256).     
     Zertal (2005) theorized the trial as a “consciousness-changing event” (p.95). 
The personal traumatic memories of the Holocaust survivors (the absolute 
victimhood) were brought up to the public sphere through their public 
testimonies24 and, for the first time (fourteen years after the Holocaust), integrated 
in the Israeli collective memory. However, following the legacy of the constitutive 
narrative of power and renewal, the testimonies of absolute victimhood were 
indeed communicated, but, they were presented from a “position of power, 
sovereignty, and control” (p.95). The constitutive narrative was now as followed: 
“[t]he total helplessness of European Jewry in World War ІІ could now directly 
serve as the “counter metaphor” to the discourse of Israeli omnipotence and also 
as its ultimate justification” (p.95). The absolute victimhood of the Holocaust 
could now be integrated in the public discourse but, instrumentally, as Israel’s 
ultimate justification.  
     As suggested, the trial of a high rank SS Nazi officer in Jerusalem introduced a 
new hegemonic discourse to the Israeli society. A discourse that can best be 
summarized by an editorial headline from a special edition of a leading newspaper 
that was published hours after the announcement of Eichmann’s capture:  
“Only the Jewish state can now defend Jewish blood” 25. Zertal (2005) 
interpreted this content (and much more alike) and coherently concluded 
the “tone” of Israel’s discourse during the year of the trial:     
“[T]he Holocaust, along with its victims, was not to be remembered for 
itself but rather as a metaphor, a terrible, sublime lesson to Israeli 
                                                 
24 The trial was broadcasted live on national radio and was the centre of the public discourse.   
25 Yedioth Aharonoth. Cited from Zertal (2005, p.95).  
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youth and the world that Jewish blood would never be abandoned or 
defenseless again” (p.96). 
 
     In other words, the legacy of the Eichmann trial was that the victimhood of the 
Holocaust have to be constantly sublime, both domestically and internationally, 
but to be communicate and remembered from a position of power (Jewish blood 
would never be abandoned or defenseless again). As will be seen next this “tone” 
appears regularly in periods of crises. 
Summary 
Both of the presented discourses, the constitutive narrative of power and renewal 
and the legacy of the Eichmann trial, selectively and instrumentally construct the 
memory of the Holocaust as to fit the frame of the “new Israeli”. As described, in 
the purpose of creating the new type of Israel there is a need to erase the ‘shame’ 
of the “old Jew”, which went like sheep to the slaughter. Nevertheless, the 
objective victimhood of the systematic extermination of Europe Jewry can well 
serve as a moralist argumentation for the right of Israel to exist. Therefore, the 
instrumental logic, as will be seen next, was not to erase the memory of the 
passive victim, but on the contrary; to construct both frames (“new Jew”/“old 
Jew”) and to use them purposely for different objectives.  
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The Revival of Holocaust-Related-Themes in Periods of 
Crises 
As presented in the methodological chapter, one of my main goals, in the 
discourse analysis, will be to point on a historical continuity and/or overlapping of 
discourses; in order to evaluate how the traditional revival of Holocaust-related-
themes, in periods of crises, operates in the current crisis with Iran. Accordingly, I 
will describe next the traditional tendency of the Holocaust memory to reconstruct 
itself in contemporary frame of reference. It will also indicate on the cultural 
origin of the Holocaust, since; as presented in the theoretical chapter, the tendency 
of discourses to reconstruct themselves in contemporary terms indicates on their 
cultural nature. 
     I will base the next section on the very extensive book by Tom Segev - The 
Seventh Million: the Israelis and the Holocaust – which profoundly explored the 
decisive impact of the Holocaust on the identity, ideology, and politics of Israel. 
Segev’s book will use me as the leading source of quotations.  
1956: the Sinai Campaign 
In a flash attack by the Israeli army on Egypt’s territory (the Sinai Peninsula and 
the Gaza strip), which was coordinated with France and Britain that attacked the 
Suez Canal to the south, in order to protect their past colonial interests in the Suez 
Canal that was nationalized by Nasser, the Israeli army managed to occupy both 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip. The period prior to the campaign was 
characterized by constant attacks by Arabic militias on Israeli settlements, 
bordering to Egypt and Jordan; by Egyptian power maximization; and the 
mobilization of hostile rhetoric’s towards Israel. Under this destructive atmosphere 
both the Israeli press and politicians “compared Nasser to Hitler in both articles 
and cartoons” (Segev 1993, p.297), and the war, which was led by French and 
Britain, was argued to prevent “Nasser from turning into the Hitler of the east” 
(Maariv, cited in Segev, p.297).  
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     In response to international condemnation, for Israel’s occupation of the Sinai 
peninsula and the Gaza strip, Holocaust-related-themes were used by Israeli 
politicians, and by the Israeli media, in order to “score debating points” (Segev 
1993, p.297). I would like to illustrate the Israeli argumentation with a quote (by 
an Israeli politician) that, according to my interpretation, coherently represents the 
employment of what I regarded, in the section above, as Israel’s ‘appeal’ to the 
world ‘beaten conscience’ in order to legitimates its ‘right of self defence’:      
“A million and a half young people and children were slaughtered in broad 
daylight, and the world’s conscience was not moved… But now that the Jews 
are gathered in to the State of Israel, the outside world cannot give its 
consent. Its conscience bothers it, apparently because they refuse to go to 
the slaughter, but defend themselves courageously” (Segev, p.297).  
 
Evidently, the appeal and employment of the Holocaust memory to justify Israel’s 
offensive did not score enough debating points. Both the U.S. and USSR 
threatened Israel with severe consequences if not retreating from the occupied 
Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip. The threats erupted “deep existential anxiety” 
(Segev 1993, p.297) in Israel’s political discourse: “I am a Jew of the Exile, and I 
am frightened. It will be outright extermination”; “It’s death”; “It would have 
turned into a catastrophe for the State of Israel” (p.298). These sorts of statements 
were commonly used by Israeli politicians due to U.S. and USSR threats. In sum, 
following the crisis of 1956 deep existential anxiety spread among Israel’s 
leadership; deep existential anxiety that, as described by Segev, intimately related 
to the catastrophic scope of the Holocaust.  
1967: the Six-Day War 
The “waiting period”26 was characterized by deep existential anxiety in the Israeli 
public, as well. The Arabs mobilized threats such as: “the U.S. Sixth Fleet were 
                                                 
26 Nasser’s (Egyptian president) decisions, in mid-May 1967, to expel the UN force from the Israeli-
Egyptian border in Gaza strip; to blockade the Strait of Tiran (blocking by it Israel’s southern port (Eilat)); 
and to sign a defense agreement with Jordan (alongside the already tight military relation with Syria), were 
interpreted in Israel as the “waiting period”; a period of a few weeks of angst waiting to an ‘unavoidable 
war’.           
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standing ready to evacuate Jews from Israel and predicted that those who remained 
would be slaughtered” (Segev 1993, p.389), those were constantly broadcast on 
Arab radio (in “bad Hebrew” (p.389)) and contributed to the already widespread 
consciousness in Israel that: “the Arabs were about to “exterminate Israel”” 
(p.389). From such a collective existential perception, it is not a surprise that, 
“many Israelis were floundering in desolation and hopelessness” (p.387). And 
under this destructive atmosphere, Holocaust-related-themes prospered and, 
literately, took over the national discourse.   
     Israel was waiting “for the next holocaust” (Segev 1993, p.389). “[N]ewspapers 
continually identified Nasser with Hitler” (p.390) and collective agents, such as 
the former chief of military intelligence, described in a leading Israeli newspaper 
(an article that was also distributed to the Israeli army) “the classic anti-Semitic 
elements in the religious and political thinking of the Arab countries, including 
references to the protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion and racist arguments 
drawn from Nazi ideology” (p.391). Associations from the “gas-chambers” 
appeared, due to the extensive coverage of Nasser’s employment of chemical 
warfare against Yemen (p.391), and, “[a]ll this stirred up old Holocaust anxieties” 
(p.391). The following quote, by a former parliament member and an eminent 
commentator in Haaretz newspaper, can illustrate the discursive existentialistic 
perception of reality, during the waiting period. A reality that was compared to the 
legacy of the Holocaust:  
“What is at issue is the existence or nonexistence of the Jewish people. We 
must crush the machinations of the new Hitler at the outset, when it is still 
possible to crush them and survive. It is irresponsible folly not to believe what 
Nasser has been writing and saying for the last twelve years. Neither the 
world nor the Jews believed the sincerity of Hitler’s declarations. … Nasser’s 
fundamental strategy is the same as Hitler’s” [it is crucial to add that this 
article was ‘backed’ by an already printed index of “comparable statements by 
Nasser and Hitler”] (p.391).  
      
According to Segev (1993), the memory of the Holocaust was instrumentalized by 
collective agents who opposed any attempt “to defuse the crisis by any means 
 40
other than war” (p.390). Diplomatic initiatives, to defuse the crisis, “were 
compared with the Munich agreement forced on Czechoslovakia before World 
War ІІ” (p.390). Evidently, the collective memory of the Holocaust revived and 
took over the Israeli discourse in the weeks before the war.  
     However, the optimal results of the war27 (in pure military terms) logically 
contradicted the extermination-anxiety that spread in the Israeli collective. How 
can such contradiction be explained?  
“The threat of “extermination” had not, then, been real. But the fear of 
it had been real, and fear is what Eshkol’s [Israel’s Prime-Minister at 
that time] opponents exploited. More than any other factor, fear had 
prompted the war – the same fear that had contributed to … the 
Dimona project [Israel’s nuclear program]. Its roots lay in the 
Holocaust.” (Segev 1993, p.392) 
 
In other words, due to the past experience of the Holocaust, which 
constituted fear of group extermination in the Israeli sense of common 
identity, some antagonists, who new better than the general public the ‘real’ 
relations of power in the region, instrumentalized this sort of existential 
fears for political mobilization.  
     In conclusion, to this point, the Eichmann trial and the six-day war (along with 
the presented Sinai war) represents the reconstruction of the Holocaust memory as 
a leading cultural memory in the Israeli society, and as an active agent in Israel’s 
discourse concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. As interpreted by Zertal (2005, 
Ch.3), the 1967 war was an application of the Holocaust discourse that has been 
constructed along the Eichmann trial (1960-1962); a traumatic memory of defeat 
(the Holocaust) that used as the ultimate justification to Israel’s position of power, 
sovereignty, and control. In other words, the memory of the Holocaust 
reconstructed itself in contemporary frame of reference and, as coherently argued 
by Levy & Sznaider (2002):  
“It [the Holocaust] became a symbol for existential fears and the necessity to 
construct and maintain a strong military state. It was transformed into one 
                                                 
27 The conquest of the “Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank together with East Jerusalem, and 
the Golan Heights” (p.391) in a flash war of six days.   
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more example of the archetypical Jewish story, one more instance where the 
enemies of the Jewish people tried to exterminate them and did not quite 
succeed. As such, it was mapped onto the Arab/Israeli conflict and has 
remained there ever since.” (p.96) 
 
1969-1973: the Aftermath of 1967; the War of Attrition and Terrorism      
The Egyptian never really accepted the 1967 occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and 
between 1969 and 1970 strategically shelled the Israeli military posts along the 
Suez Canal in what can be described as a small scale war or war of attrition. This 
war was minimally covered by the Israeli media and almost kept nameless. In 
accordance, the existential perception of fear of group extinction did not appear in 
the public discourse.  
     However, following the geo-politic reality of post 1967 those were the 
‘prosperous’ years of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which 
escalated its struggle28 internationally, and in relation to my line of interest two 
terrorist events, out of many, were most associated to “the Nazi murder of the 
Jews” (Segev 1993, p.393). The September 1972 kidnapping and executing of the 
Israeli Olympic team, in the summer Olympics games in Munich (mostly referred 
to as the “Munich massacre”), and the September 1973 attack on a passenger train 
transporting Russian Jews from the Soviet Union to a transit camp in Austria. Both 
incidents were direct assaults on Israeli symbols (Israel’s support of the Diaspora 
and an official national Olympic team) and ironically took place in Austria and 
Germany. Consequently, those two events were associated and linked with the 
memory of the Holocaust in the Israeli discourse. 
1973: the Yom-Kippur war 
The fasting of Yom-Kippur is probably the most accounted Jewish custom. Most 
symbolically, a day before this ancient commemorative day (in the Jewish annual 
calendar), October 5, 1973, Israel was attacked by the regular armies of Egypt and 
Syria. It was a surprise attack that cost dearly to the Israeli army. At some point, in 
                                                 
28 Described by Segev (1993) as a “terror campaign” (p.393).  
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the first days of the war, it seemed that Israel was on the path of defeat. It is 
described by Segev (1993) as an “earthquake” that “shook the very foundations of 
Israel: it spread fear among the decision makers and undermined the morale of the 
nation” (p.393). And consequently, in a repetitive tendency, “the spectre of the 
Holocaust again stalked the land” (p.393). Accordingly, the consequences of this 
war are described as a “blow to the nation’s sense of identity” (Segev1993, p.394):  
Israel as the ‘safe-haven’ for Jews was now officially vulnerable. As quoted 
by an Israeli Col.:  
“[T]he whole monolithic system we had brought with us from school- 
anti- Semitism—Zionism- security- was cracked.” (p.394)  
 
In sum, if until the Yom-Kippur war the hegemonic discourse was of “Holocaust 
and heroism” (Segev 1993, p.395) then the post war discourse of 1973 was of 
vulnerability; realizing the “meaning of the Holocaust and the limitations of 
heroism” (p.395). 
1981: Israel’s Attack on an Iraqi Nuclear Facility 
The destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facility by the Israeli air-force was justified by 
Israel’s PM (Begin), in an interview to a foreign newspaper, in direct relation to 
the Holocaust:   
“We must protect our nation, a million and a half of whose children were 
murdered by the Nazis in the gas chambers.” (Segev 1993, p.399) 
 
In the same communicated remark the PM argued that an attempt by Iraq to 
rebuild its nuclear program will be followed by the same Israeli response.  
     Concerning the leading conservative (right-wing) politician, Menachem Begin, 
it is crucial to add that he is regarded by Segev (1993) as “[t]he great popularizer 
of the Holocaust… A master of the symbolic historical gesture, [that] missed no 
opportunity to exploit the Holocaust in debating his political opponents and in 
creating his own political image” (pp.397-98).  
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1982-1984: Lebanon War 
The master of the symbolic historical gesture (Begin), that ordered the attack on 
the Iraqi nuclear facility, justifying it by the Jewish experience in the Holocaust, is 
the same PM, that ordered the invasion of Lebanon, in order to drive out of 
Lebanon the PLO, comparing it (the PLO) to Nazism, and justifying the action 
with the memory of the Holocaust (Segev 1993, p.399). As an indication, the 
Israeli PM justified the invasion to his cabinet as Followed: 
“Such is our fate in Israel. There is no way other than to fight selflessly. 
Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka [a Nazi concentration camp], and we 
have decided that there will be no more Treblinkas.” (p.399) 
 
Moreover, in face of the international criticism to the invasion the PM tried to win 
debating scores with the same tendency of his formers: an ‘appeal’ of blame to the 
‘beaten conscious’ of the international community: 
* “No one, anywhere in the world, can preach morality to our people.”  
 
* Relating to an English newspaper (London Times) that criticized the 
invasion:  
“A newspaper that supported the treachery of the Munich agreement 
should be very careful in preaching morality to a small nation fighting 
for its life. Had we listened to it we would no longer exist.” (p.399) 
 
* The content of a letter that was sent to U.S. President Reagan, after the 
demolition of Arafat’s (PLO leader) headquarters in Beirut, was titled in a 
Yediot Aharonot as followed: 
“Begin to Reagan: I Feel like I Have Sent the Army into Berlin to 
Destroy Hitler in His Bunker.” (p.570) 
 
Apparently, also in the 80’s (approximately forty years after the event of the 
Holocaust) “[t]he Holocaust was inevitably dragged into the political debater” 
(Segev 1993, p.400). However, in the early 80’s the Israeli public did not take the 
narrative of power and renewal for granted and the discourse has been influenced 
also by less belligerent themes (Shapira 2007, p.138). Unlike previous wars, that 
were characterized by hegemonic Holocaust discourses of redemption, the 
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Lebanon war “divided the country deeply” (p.400), and a counter Holocaust-
related-discourse appeared: 
“Hitler is already dead, Mr. Prime Minster” (Segev 1993, p.400), wrote an 
elite Israeli author (Amos Oz) in a reaction to Begin’s instrumentilzation of 
the memory of the Holocaust. Yeshayahu Leibowitz (an Israeli philosopher) 
referred to the Lebanon war in terms of a “Judeo-Nazi policy” (p.401); and, 
a Holocaust survivor protested against the war and the instrumentilzation of 
the Holocaust memory in order to justify it with a hunger strike in the gates 
of the Yad Vashem museum (Israel’s Holocaust commemoration site).      
     Those are just few examples for illustrating the ‘tone’ of the counter-discourse 
and to illustrate the enthusiastic mobilization of Holocaust-related-themes, in 
contemporary frame of reference, by both sides of the political spectrum.  
1990-1991: the Persian Gulf War 
Same like Nasser and Arafat also Saddam Hussein “was compared to Hitler” 
(Segev 1993, p.505). In this crisis it was common to assume that chemical 
weaponry will be used against the State of Israel. The millions of citizens of Israel 
all received gas masks and instructions of how to protect themselves against 
chemical attacks, in a campaign carried out by the Israeli army. The “chemical 
threat” resulted with “a return of the feeling before the Six-Day War” (p.505) and 
in line with the tendency of previous wars: “this one too brought the Holocaust to 
the forefront of public consciousness” (p.505).  
     However, unlike previous wars, where Israelis experienced the horrors of war 
as soldieries in the front or citizens in public shelters, this war was experienced in 
the private homes of the citizens “each person for himself and his family, in his 
sealed room, isolated within his gas mask… huddled together [those who did not 
flee] helplessly expecting the worst” (Segev 1993, p.506-7). This intimate, but yet 
collective experience, was described by Segev in a sentence (the concluding 
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sentence for the whole book) that I would like to highlight separately, due to its 
poetic interpretation of the reality.  
“Never before had so many Israelis shared so Jewish an experience” 
The traditional experience of the Diaspora Jews, to depend on the mercies of their 
hosts, was experienced, in 1992, not in the Diaspora but in the Jewish homeland.    
Summary 
As was illustrated in the brief review of the Israeli discourse in periods of crises, 
the memory of the Holocaust was communicated by collective agents that through 
emotional appeal (speech act theory) and reconstructed the trauma claim of the 
Holocaust in contemporary frame of reference. The metaphor of the Holocaust 
was traditionally communicated by collective agents; it was communicated with a 
fixed cultural formation; and it appealed to society’s web of meaning.    
     It was the harsh American and Soviet criticism on Israel’s occupation of Sinai 
and Gaza, in 1954, that spread Holocaust anxieties in the Israeli discourse. In 
1967, the anticipation to war, in the “waiting period”, constructed acute Holocaust 
anxieties in the Israeli discourse; existential discourse that later transformed into 
euphoria, in a sweep military victory; a transformation of emotions from 
desolation to spiritual-elevation that both related to the memory of the Holocaust. 
As an illustration, I would like to present a statement by Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust 
survivor and Nobel peace prize awarded (1986), in the midst of euphoria:  
“[T]housand years of suffering, expectations, and hope were mobilized in the 
battle, as well as the millions of Holocaust victims. As clouds of fire they came 
and protected their inheritors… The enemy lost the war also because of the 
Holocaust, that is, because of some expressions he employed. Not knowing 
that there are words that cannot be expressed in our generation, in regard to 
the Jewish people.” (Zertal 2005, p.114) 
 
     The post six-day-war euphoria was short coming and was followed, six years 
later, in the nearly defeat of the Yom Kippur war, with severe Holocaust anxieties. 
From then on, the Holocaust memory was instrumentalized to justify a surprise 
attack on Iraq’s nuclear program; to justify a disputed invasion to Lebanon; and a 
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decade later, ‘genuine’ Holocaust anxieties erupted under the “chemical threat” 
from Iraq.  
     All together, it is of evidence that Holocaust-related-themes took a major part 
in the Israeli discourse in periods of crises. The collective memory of the 
Holocaust clearly reconstructed itself in contemporary frame of reference 
indicating on its cultural traumatic origin. Zertal (2005) referred to this evidential 
tendency as the “Nazification of the enemy” (p.174). 
The Sociocognitive Implication from Trauma 
As suggested by Milliken, in the methodological chapter, theoretical categories 
can be drawn from and help to interpret the empirical data. Due to my tendency to 
detect the overlapping characteristics of historical continuity, in the discourse, 
abstraction will be of major importance for revealing such tendencies, and for 
better describing the social category of the collective memory of the Holocaust as 
a social phenomenon domestically in Israel. 
     It is argued that every modern state tends to instrumentalize its collective 
memory in order to match it with the national narrative (Zertal 2005, p.59). The 
memory of the Holocaust is argued to play a crucial role in this respect. Zertal 
(2005) touched upon this sensitive social category and interpreted “the way in 
which Israel's collective memory of death and trauma was created and produced, 
and how it has been processed, coded, and put to use in Israel's public space” 
(p.1). She concluded that the memory of the Holocaust is being employed, by 
Israeli collective agents, as an instrument for the creation of a collective identity, 
and she defined it in the framework of “the politics of death in the service of the 
nation” (p.1). Consequently, when a society defines itself in relation to an 
existentialist memory, such as the Holocaust; when traumatic anxieties, as 
portrayed by the memory of the Holocaust, are being used as an agent for the 
construction of collective memory, cognitive implications must be followed. In 
other words, the extensive use of Holocaust-related-themes, as shown above, must 
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have some emotional affect on the Israeli society. Indeed, Zertal (2005) regards 
the collective emotional effect to such an extent as to define the Israeli society as 
driven by “culture of death” (p.1). 
     Zertal’s theorization of “culture of death” relates to, and can be detected by, the 
representation of Holocaust-related-themes in the discourse. In order to point on 
more specific consistencies between theoretical categories and the actual 
discourse, I will concentrate in my interpretation, first and most on the presented 
tendency (in the Israeli political discourse) to ‘appeal’ to the international 
community conscious for the justification of its sovereignty and relevant power. 
Secondly, I will borrow theoretical categories that were presented to describe the 
two constituting Holocaust discourses. From the constitutive legacy of power and 
renewal I will use theories such as New Jews Old Jews, the theory of death, and 
the structural paradox of the victim-community. And from the constitutive legacy 
of the Eichmann trial, I will try to identify the habitual tendency to communicate 
the victimhood of the Holocaust from a position of power, sovereignty, and 
control. Thirdly, a crucial theory for my interpretation will be the sociocognitive 
characterization of the Israeli society in terms of “siege mentality” (Bar – Tal & 
Teichman 2005). According to Bar – Tal and Teichman’s (2005; Stereotypes and 
Prejudice in Conflict), the course of the Arab-Jewish conflict is the main 
“contextual factor in the evolvement of Israel’s negative intergroup psychological 
repertoire about Arabs” (p.92). However, the historical event of the Holocaust, 
which is described as the climax of an ancient history of “persecution, libel, social 
taxation, restriction, forced conversion, expulsion, and pogroms” (p.96), has major 
sociocognitive implication on the Israeli Jewish society; a society that is theorized 
by the writers in terms of siege mentality (pp.92-96).  
     The sociocognitive implications of the siege mentality can be described by a 
“pessimistic world view: [when] nothing good can be expected from the “rest of 
the world”” (Bar – Tal & Teichman 2005, p.97). Such cognitive perception is 
characterized, domestically in Israel, with the collective ethos that the Jewish 
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society stands alone in a hostile world; a pessimistic world view that views the 
nations of the world as “evil, immoral, utilitarian, indifferent, and often brutal” 
(p.97).  
     Rooted in the long term history of the Diaspora, and the short term history of 
Israel, is sociocognitive emotional perceptions that results with deep mistrust 
about the world intentions. Consequently, the writers described Israeli Jews as 
highly sensitive to information; information that come from the outside world, and 
is usually presented as evidence for reaffirming the already constitutive perception 
of the negative intentions of the world (Bar – Tal & Teichman 2005, pp.97-98). 
     Finally, Bar-Tal (1998) presented eight themes for describing the societal 
beliefs of a society that is coping with intractable conflict (such as the Israeli 
society): the justness of one's own goals, societal beliefs about security, 
adversary's delegitimization, positive self image, own victimization, patriotism, 
unity, and own wish for peace. Those themes are usually “incorporated into the 
ethos and are reflected in the group's language, stereotypes, images, myths and 
collective memories” (p.8), and are of such sociocognitive influence as to 
“contribute to the solidification of social identity” (p.8). I would like to use those 
theoretic categories instrumentally and to interpret how they are reflected in the 
Israeli political discourse concerning Iran.  
Summary 
In my view, pessimism is the collective common sense for a nation who 
experienced the horrors of the abyss. In order to tackle this perception I chose to 
use the collective memory of the Holocaust, as a social category, and to explore its 
revival and reconstruction in relation to the “Iranian threat”. My assumption is that 
Iran’s  maximization of power and its hostile rhetoric’s against Israel’s most 
intimate sense of identity (Zionism and Holocaust) are communicated in Israel as 
evidence for the negative intentions of the world, reaffirming, in return (in 
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contemporary terms), Zertal’s perception of Israel as a society which is driven by 
culture of death.  
     Consequently, I presented above theoretical categories that might account to 
Israel’s sociocognitive perception in the current crisis with Iran. Theoretical 
categories, that are rooted in Israel’s two constitutive Holocaust discourses; eight 
themes that can help in describing Israel’s societal beliefs under an intractable 
conflict; Israel’s mentality of siege; and a theoretical assumption concerning the 
traditional tendency of Israel to ‘appeal’ to the international community conscious 
for justifying its sovereignty and relevant power, those theories will be abstracted 
and used in different dosages for interpreting the assumed overlapping of the 












5 Israel’s Highest Authority Codification of 
the “Iranian Threat”  
 
The contextualization of the constitutive legacy of the Holocaust in the Israeli 
sense of collectively, the visualization of the traditional revival of Holocaust-
related-themes in periods of crises, and the theoretical account concerning the 
sociocognitive implications of collective trauma, domestically in Israel, were all 
presented in the previous chapter and will use me next - through the 
methodological tool of abstraction of theory – for the interpretation of the 
instrumental logic of the memory of the Holocaust; the interpretation of the 
stability of the discourse; and for implying concerning the sociocognitive 
implications that such a memory might have on Israel’s behavior in the 
international realm (specify here by Israel’s communication).  
     Following Alexander (2004) theorization of the speech act theory, which 
suggests that collective agents tend to construct and codify understanding of the 
‘real world’ in a way that will fit already existing cultural meanings, I seek to 
detect how Israel’s PM constructs his meaning in relation to the Iranian issue.  
Leading metaphors, that repeatedly appear in the content, and can be therefore 
represented as hegemonic discourses with fix dominant meanings, will be 
explored, and the narrative approach, which calls to linguistically interpret 
rhetoric’s as “cultural stories” (Silverman 2003, p.345), will guide me in order to 
describe if and how Israel’s PM uses, in his speeches, cultural stories that fit the 
available and familiar narratives of the society.  
     All together, I seek to point on the overlapping of Holocaust discourses, in the 
current crisis with Iran, pointing on the assumingly cultural traumatic nature of the 
collective memory of the Holocaust in Israel; its tendency to revive in 
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contemporary frame of reference. In more general terms, I seek to imply 
concerning the destructive influence that ‘identity issues’ might play in the 
communication of hostile actors. How hostile identities might escalate an already 
escalated SD and how hostile myths might stimulate fear of group extinction in the 
incited state. 
     For the purpose of describing and interpreting such themes in the Israeli 
discourse I chose to open with three highly symbolic and mobilized (through the 
Israeli media) speeches by Israel’s highest authority: Israel’s PM. The first speech 
was given at a Holocaust memorial site in Berlin Germany; the second was given 
in an event at Israel’s Holocaust commemoration centre: Yad-Vashem; and the 
third in the U.S. in front of the utmost representative and influential body of the 
Diaspora: the annual General Assembly of the United Jewish Communities. 
Hopefully, the symbolic magnitude of the events will be in help for describing 
how the collective memory of the Holocaust; a hegemonic narrative with fix 
dominant meanings in Israel’s “area of objectivised culture” (Assmann & 
Czaplicka 1995, p.127), is communicated by Israel’s highest authority.  
Israel’s Prime Minister in Germany  
The first content is from a speech that was given by Israel’s PM (Ehud Olmert) in 
a highly symbolic event, which took place at a highly symbolic frame of time. 
Accompany by German’s Chancellor (Angela Merkel) Israel’s PM mobilized a 
Holocaust thematic speech, at a Memorial Ceremony at the Grünwald train station 
in Berlin29, as most symbolically - for my purpose - the speech was mobilized in 
the closing day of Iran’s two day “Holocaust convention” (December 12, 2006)30. 
     Expectedly, Holocaust related themes were repetitively communicated by 
Israel’s PM in an occasion that was held in a Holocaust commemoration site. 
However, the interpretation reveals that those themes were communicated 
                                                 
29 The same train station (platform) where about 60 thousand Jews made their way to Nazi death camps in 
Auschwitz, Dachau, and Theresienstadt.  
30 PM-office (accessed: 08.06.2008) [online]. URL - 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2006/12/speechgru121206.htm 
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instrumentally. They were mobilized in accordance with the traditional tendency 
to authenticate the established of the state of Israel as a new form of existence and 
a triumph over the history of the Diaspora, and as an ‘appeal’ to the world ‘beaten 
conscience’ (from the Holocaust), in order to emphasize the world ‘moral debt’ to 
‘deal’ with contemporary threats to Israel’s existent.  
     All together, in accordance with the sociocognitive implications of the 
mentality of siege, Israel’s PM constructs the pessimistic realization that the 
Jewish people stand alone in a hostile world and following the experience of the 
Holocaust they should not rely on the mercy of strangers.    
The Victimhood 
The total victimhood of the Diaspora Jews is poetically communicated by Israel’s 
PM: 
“I stand here, in the name of the sovereign State of Israel … hear a mixture of 
incomplete words, a suffocated cry, a child wailing, a mother pleading, an old 
man groaning.  Above them bursts a screeching command – cold, cutting, 
brutal – and in the background an engine shrieking, a piercing screech, 
congested coaches slammed shut, sealing a cry of horror; and then the echo 
subsides in a metallic crunching of wheels speeding into the distance.”  
  
Following the theorization of the “speech act theory” (Alexander 2004, 11) we can 
clearly witness, in this citation, a process in where a collective agent (in this case 
Israel’s PM) communicates with his/her audience (members of the carrier group) 
in a symbolic terminology, which most explicitly relates to a traumatic event of 
the past, in this case; the collective memory of the Holocaust.  
     The suffocated cry; the child wailing; the mother pleading; and the old man 
groaning are presented as the echo of a mixture of incomplete words of Jews as 
they are boarding the train at the Grünwald platform (approximately sixty years 
ago) on their way to annihilation. The victimhood is symbolized here by one 
platform out of many (across Europe) and is communicated in the name of the 
sovereign State of Israel (as highlighted by Israel’s PM in the opening sentence of 
the speech).  
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     Evidently, in accordance with the constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial, the 
victimhood of the Holocaust is communicated but it is communicated from the 
position of Israel’s sovereignty and, as will be seen, from a position of relevant 
power.  
The Renewal  
The traumatic memory of the Holocaust is being constructed, by Israel’s PM, as a 
moralist legitimization for the establishment of the state of Israel. After poetically 
introducing the victimhood of Europe Jewry the PM makes the causal link 
between the defeat of the Diaspora and the establishment of Israel.  
     The extermination of the Diaspora is undoubtedly related to the fact that a 
Jewish “safe haven” did not exist at the time: “[t]hey [Europe Jewry] did not have 
these [“a safe haven”; “a harbour”; “a lighthouse”; “a sheltered home”] until the 
establishment of the State of Israel”. The consequences of the Holocaust are 
presented as the result of not having a Jewish state; a Jewish state that, in line with 
the Zionist narrative, is described by Israel’s PM as a “safe haven” for Jewish 
existence.  
     In accordance with the constitutive narrative of power and renewal the trauma 
of the Holocaust is adopted instrumentally as an explicit evidence for the 
correctness of the core ideology of Zionism (the establishment of a Jewish 
“lighthouse”) and as a legitimating argument for Israel’s existence.  
     Moreover, in line with the structural paradox of the victim community - where 
an absolute defeat tend to be coded in a victorious frame - it is of evidence that the 
victimhood of the Holocaust is not only communicated from the relatively 
powerful position of Israel’s sovereignty it is also coded as a triumph over the 
perpetrator: ‘we’ - the victims - overcame the victimizer.  
     The Nazi regime has been thrown to the ‘garbage of history’ and the Jewish 
people carries on. Not only that the Nazi perpetrator did not succeed with its final 
solution the establishment of the State of Israel symbolizes the victory of the 
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victim over the victimizer. The “values of the Torah [Heb.: the old-testament] and 
the prophets of Israel” still exist. They exist ‘now’, in the formation of sovereignty 
state, and they are portrayed in a speech that is mobilized in Berlin, sixty years 
after the Holocaust, as a triumph over the perpetrator ideology. In other words, 
although that the victimizer did leave its legacy (“the legacy of our six million 
dead”) this legacy is memorized, by Israel’s PM, in a victorious frame: the values 
of the Torah and the prophets of Israel still exist – implying that the victim 
prevailed.   
The World’s Conscience  
Like the traditional legacy of his predecessors also the current Israeli PM publicly 
communicates with the world’s conscience, and since the speech was given in 
Berlin - the previous capitol of the Nazi Reich - the ‘appeal’ to the world’s 
conscience increases symbolically.  
     After poetically presenting the victimhood of Europe Jewry in a victorious 
frame of renewal, the PM makes it clear that, the victimhood is not forgotten, on 
the contrary, the memory of the Holocaust “resurfaces again and again” and the 
‘blame’ for the consequences of Holocaust (the legacy of our six million dead) is 
not directed against Germany alone, which “blocked” and “sealed” its roads (to 
prevent the Jews from escaping), the ‘blame’ is constructed by this Israeli PM, as 
well, on “all countries of the world”:  
Even if “given the option of leaving this country [Germany]” the Jews had 
no sanctuary: “the shores of all countries of the world – were sealed and 
bolted to them”. Israel’s PM is publicly ‘appealing’ to the world’s 
conscience and rhetorically asks what they (all countries of the world) have 
done to unseal the roads? If not explicit enough the answer soon follows: 
“There was only one road for those who had been forcibly herded at 
this station: the road heading east, from which there was no return.” 
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Evidently, the world conscience is a major theme in the PM communication. In 
this speech, the PM mobilizes one of the most instrumentalized lessons from the 
Holocaust (in Israel) that traditionally was used in periods of crises, in order to 
‘appeal’ to the world conscious, and to score debating scores. The accountability 
for the Holocaust consequences (the annihilation of Europe’s Jewry) is 
traditionally presented in the Israeli discourse not only as a Nazi legacy but as a 
universal legacy of the world (all countries of the world - as articulated here). The 
many countries that cooperated with the Nazis; did not combat the Nazis; sealed 
their roads and ports from Jewish escape; or ‘just’ refused to accept Jewish 
refugees31, are all accountable to the consequences of the Holocaust (according to 
the conventional Israeli discourse).  
     Accordingly, much attention is given to the world conscience, and as will be 
visualized and interpreted next; the ‘appeal’ to the world conscience is constructed 
instrumentally, in order to justify Israel’s position in regards to contemporary 
threat: “those [meaning Iran] who threaten to eradicate them [the Jewish people]”.  
The Legitimization of Power  
Following the mobilization of the absolute victimhood, as a justification for 
Israel’s establishment (a “sheltered home” for the Jews), comes a paragraph that 
can be interpret as a straight forward justification for Israel’s position of power.  
     The victimhood of the Holocaust is well communicated (the road heading east, 
from which there was no return, and / or, the legacy of our six million dead) and 
following the constitutive narrative of power and renewal it (the victimhood) is 
presented, by the PM, as the causal consequences of having no state (“Jews did not 
have a state then”).  
     Through the victimhood of Europe Jewry Israel’s current PM makes the logical 
argument that the State of Israel must be legitimized as a safe haven for Jewish 
                                                 
31 Most ’sticking out’ are Great Britain that strategically abstracted much resources from its Navy (that was 
preoccupied in a World War), to seal the shores of Palestine,  preventing Jewish refugees to escape Europe 
and in some cases turning them back to their destiny in Europe, and U.S., that used minimum recourses (if 
any) to assist Europe Diaspora.   
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existence and a triumph over the history of the Diaspora. From this construction of 
meaning the PM then mobilizes one of the most constitutive lessons from the 
Holocaust: never-again. He constructs it from a relative position of power and 
control (the position of a sovereignty state), and in contemporary frame of 
reference:  
“We have learned and memorized the lesson: the weak and defenceless are 
doomed.  Doomed are they who do not believe those who threaten to 
eradicate them. Doomed are they who remain complacent and do not prepare 
themselves to thwart the danger.” 
 
The constitutive narrative of never-again comes from the “consciousness-changing 
event” (Zertal 2005, p.95) of the Eichmann trial and is regarded as a ‘slogan’ for 
the most common narrative in Israel’s Jewish society: Jewish blood would never 
be abandoned or defenseless again. It is well articulated here: the weak and 
defenceless are doomed…Doomed are they who remain complacent and do not 
prepare themselves to thwart the danger, and the message is clear and coherent:  
Israel has memorized the lesson and will use any object in its power to 
thwart the danger. The danger is represented in contemporary frame of 
reference (those who threaten [in present time] to eradicate them [the 
Jewish people]) and, as will be seen later, it comes as a direct reference to 
the “Iranian threat”.  
     Following the legacy of the Eichmann trial, the communication of the absolute 
victimhood (as represented by the Holocaust) is from a position of power and 
sovereignty, and in accordance with the traditional ‘appeal’ to the world 
conscious. Israel’s current PM (Olmert) clearly communicates with the world 
conscious and dose so to justify Israel’s relevant power.  
     All together, right until now, following the sociological theoretical model of 
“cultural trauma” (Alexander 2004) we can clearly witness how the traumatic 
memory of the Holocaust (the child wailing; the mother pleading; and the old man 
groaning) is associated by the PM in contemporary “frame of reference” 
(Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, p.130). 
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Anxious led Mentality  
Bar – Tal & Teichman’s (2005) classification of Israel in terms of siege mentality 
can be well authenticated by the PM speech, and strengthen the understanding of 
how sociocognitive implications, from the Jewish people grim past (represented 
here by the event of the Holocaust), influence the Israeli political discourse. After 
mobilizing the blame of the legacy of our six million dead (the “forcibly” Jewish 
exudes to a road from which there was no return) not only on “the Nazi evil” but 
on all countries of the world. Israel’s highest authority articulated the following 
judgment:  
“Doomed are they who entertain the false illusion that they could escape 
harm and that they could rely on the mercy of strangers.”  
 
The presented above reaffirms the classification of Israel in terms of siege 
mentality. The sociocognitive implications of siege mentality; pessimistic world 
view with deep mistrust about the world intentions, are clearly reaffirmed by the 
PM statement that anything else but harm is a false illusion. Secondly, the gloomy 
perception of standing alone in a hostile world is clearly visible from the 
unwillingness of Israel’s PM to rely on the mercy of strangers; the same strangers 
that were presented earlier as those who purposely sealed their shores and roads 
leaving the Jewish people with the legacy of… six million dead.  
     All together, the characterization of Israel’s mentality of siege, which is rooted 
in a traumatic legacy of helplessness and victimhood, is essential for the 
interpretation of Israel’s position of power. Because, due to the legacy of the 
Holocaust the Jewish people has learned that they stand alone in a hostile world. 
This theorization is well articulated by Israel’s PM (Doomed are they who remain 
complacent and do not prepare themselves to thwart the danger) and, in 
accordance with Kaufmann (2001) theorization of the “myth-symbol complex”, 
we can see how he communicates through emotional expression, that is presented 
as a respond to the most emotionally symbol evoked. In this case, the emotional 
expression (by the PM) is stimulated by those who threaten to eradicate Israel.   
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Own Wish for Peace 
It seems that each of Bar-Tal’s (1998) eight themes for describing the societal 
beliefs of a society that is coping with intractable conflict applies for the PM 
speech. The justness of one's own goals is represented by the lesson of the 
Holocaust. An absolute traumatic lesson that is being instrumentalized not only to 
construct Israel’s own victimization (the legacy of our six million dead) but also in 
order to justify the societal beliefs about security (We have learned and memorized 
the lesson: the weak and defenceless are doomed). The adversary’s 
delegitimization is constructed by presenting those who threaten (in present time) 
to eradicate them (the Jewish people) in association with the Nazi evil. The 
positive self image is constructed by terminology such as Israel’s “social justice 
and human morality”. Patriotism is represented by the presentation of Israel as 
“the object of their [the Jews] dreams, the land of their hopes and prayers”, and the 
construction of unity can be illustrated by the PM’s definition of the State of Israel 
in the archaic terms of the eternal values of the Torah and the prophets of Israel. 
Finally, the societal belief of own wish for peace is literately highlighted in the 
concluding sentence of the PM speech: “the legacy of our [Israel’s] six million 
dead… the sanctity of life and the dedicated pursuit of peace”. 
     In sum, we can witness above the sort of nature of norms and identities that are 
originated in Israel’s domestic realm and their reconstruction by Israel’s PM. And 
if indeed, as presented in the theoretical chapter, domestic level analysis 
influences the international realm, than, to my opinion, Israel’s behaviour in the 
international arena depends also on the interpretation of its very hectic nature of 
norms and identities, as portrayed above by Israel’s PM discursive tendency.  
Relating the Metaphor of the Holocaust to Iran  
To my interpretation, the constitutive narrative of power and renewal; the legacy 
of the Eichmann trial; and the sociocognitive mentality of siege, are of clear 
evidence in the PM communication. It points on the representation of Holocaust-
related-themes in contemporary frame of reference and, following the constitutive 
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legacy of Holocaust discourses, we can clearly see how the communication of the 
Holocaust victimhood is done from a position of power and sovereignty (the 
constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial). The victimhood is presented as the 
legacy of the Diaspora, the consequences of having no state, and as the causal 
justification for a Jewish homeland (the constitutive narrative of power and 
renewal). Moreover, in accordance with the traditional tendency of his 
predecessors the PM communicates, as well, with the world conscious in order to 
justify Israel’s use of power and/or build up of power, and during it all; pessimistic 
world view is of clear evidence. 
     However, although that the presented content visualizes the tendency to 
reconstruct the memory of the Holocaust, in contemporary frame of reference, it 
does not relate directly to Iran (except of one assumingly associated reference to 
Iran: [d]oomed are they who do not believe those who threaten to eradicate them 
(the Jewish people)). Nevertheless, the words of the PM can not be fully 
understood - in the context of the “Iranian threat” - without a description of a 
speech that followed in the same event, by the President of the Jewish Central 
Council in Germany (Charlotte Knobloch). 
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Putting the Prime Minister Speech in Context; the Jewish Clerk 
Clarification  
The coverage of the PM speech overlapped in the Israeli media (cited here from 
Ynet.com32) with Knobloch’s speech, which followed the PM speech. Like Israel’s 
PM, also Germany’s highest representative of its prospering Jewish community 
legitimizes Israel’s ‘self defense’ with the lesson of the Holocaust. 
“Especially today, in times when Israel is subject to wicked dangers all around 
it [Israel]… needs to protect itself from all directions, we must never forget 
what it means to be defenceless.”  
 
The Jewish figure justifies Israel’s sovereignty and its uses of power through the 
consequences of the Diaspora defenceless in the Holocaust. Israel, according to the 
figure, is subject to wicked dangers… and needs to protect itself from all 
directions. The contemporary security reality, of the sovereignty state of Israel, is 
instrumentally associated with the consequences of the Holocaust; justifying 
(according to this logic) Israel’s build up of defensive/offensive capabilities.  
     The Jewish figure uses, in his speech, metaphors, that are rooted in the same 
constitutive narratives that are used by Israel’s PM (as a reminder: we [Israel] have 
learned and memorized the lesson: the weak and defenceless are doomed). In 
accordance with the metaphorical and narrative approaches (as presented in the 
methodological chapters), we can clearly witness how both, Israel’s PM and the 
Jewish clerk, using in their speeches leading metaphors that are rooted in the 
constitutive legacy of the Holocaust. Constitutive Holocaust narratives, that with 
their ‘fix dominant meanings’ can be interpreted as cultural stories that fit the 
available and familiar narratives of the society.  
     Nevertheless, the significance of the speech (to my purpose), of the Jewish 
figure, is by the fact that it places the PM speech in the context of the “Iranian 
threat”, and relates the “Iranian threat” to the traumatic memory of the Holocaust. 
The Jewish figure ‘reminds’ us that:  
                                                 
32 Ynet.com, 12.12.06, Ronny Sofer; “Olmert in Berlin: Weak, defenseless doomed” (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3339140,00.html   
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“[A]t these very moments a Holocaust denial conference is being held. At 
these very moments, a group of criminals sit together, denying the Holocaust, 
tarnishing the memory of its victims, calling for the eradication of Israel, and 
planning evil acts for the future.”     
 
The linkage to the “Iranian threat” is clearly articulated here (the Holocaust denial 
conference was held in Teheran). Accordingly, the same ones who currently threat 
to eradicate the Jewish people, as presented by the PM (and assumingly associated 
to Iran), are given full context by the Jewish clerk (those who sit together [in 
Iran’s capital], denying the Holocaust, tarnishing the memory of its victims, calling 
for the eradication of Israel, and planning evil acts for the future).  
     Moreover, the sentence that follows can most coherently visualize the 
perception of the memory of the Holocaust in terms of “cultural trauma”, since it 
well articulates how the traumatic memory of the Holocaust tends to revive in 
periods of crises (in this case the Iranian crisis):  
“We can never again allow the existence of platform 17 – a platform 
leading to death.” 
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Israel’s Prime Minister in Yad-Vashem  
In October 27, 2006, approximately six weeks before the Grünwald speech, a 
speech 33 was given by the same Israeli PM (Olmert) in a ceremony at Israel’s 
official Holocaust commemoration site in Jerusalem: Yad-Vashem34.Also here, an 
official speech, by a representative figure, at a symbolic event of unveiling donor’s 
plaque at Yad-Vashem, will obviously concentrate on the need to reconstruct the 
memory of the Holocaust for next generations. After all, the purpose of the 
donation and the purpose of Yad-Vashem are both aimed on the remembrance of 
the Holocaust. And indeed, Israel’s PM does argue for the need to learn the 
lessons of the Holocaust. 
     However, although the nature of the event, which most naturally stimulates 
Holocaust themes, the importance of the speech (for my purpose) is that the 
memory of the Holocaust is instrumentalized by the PM, in contemporary frame of 
reference, indicating on the traumatic cultural nature of the Holocaust 
domestically in Israel.  
Contemporary Frame of Reference  
Already in the beginning of the speech the historic event of the Holocaust is 
framed in contemporary frame of reference; indicating on the cultural nature of the 
collective memory of the Holocaust, and validating my assumption concerning the 
traumatic nature of the Holocaust in Israel.  The memory of the Holocaust, 
according to Israel’s PM, is “not only a lesson in history, but a very important 
preparation for what we yet have at present, and may have to deal with in the 
future”. To better link the Holocaust representations (in the PM construction of 
meaning) to the Iranian issue the requested question should then be: what sort of 
                                                 
33 PM-office (accessed: 08.06.2008) [online]. URL - 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/Speeches/2006/10/speechyadvashem271006.htm 
34 Israel’s official Holocaust commemoration site in Jerusalem, where every high-rank foreign 
representative (in an official visit to Israel) is ‘obligated’ to visit, exhibits, by large, the victimhood of the 
Holocaust, but in line with the constitutive narrative of power and renewal constructs also the “beautiful 
death” of the “new Jew” in their revolt against their Nazi perpetuators (most representative by the Warsaw 
uprising) and concludes with an exhibition of the Jewish revival: the establishment of the state of Israel. 
 63
present or future threat is paralyzed, by Israel’s PM, to the most apocalyptic event 
of the Holocaust?  
     Correlating to my assumption - concerning the revival of Holocaust-related-
themes in the current crisis with Iran - Israel’s PM coherently associates the 
apocalyptic event of the Holocaust with the “Iranian threat”:  
“[H]ow so many people could hear what was said, but did nothing. How could 
the world hear the incitement by the Nazi Regime in Germany, and somehow 
keep on living as if it was not real… These very days, we hear similar voices.  
It is the first time that a leader of a very big and important nation openly and 
publicly declares that the aim of his nation is to wipe the existence of the 
State of Israel off the map.”  
 
Referring to Iran’s president, Ahmadinejad, Israel’s PM, Olmert, paralyzes the 
historical incitement by the Nazi Regime to Iran’s calls to wipe the existence of the 
State of Israel off the map. Furthermore, in accordance with Kaufmann’s (2001) 
theorization that hostile attitudes, in a hostile SD, might stimulate fear of group 
extinction, and with the presented interpretive constructivist perception that 
materialistic patterns of behaviour might be associated with identity-related issues, 
we can see next how Iran’s communicated aspiration - to wipe the existence of the 
State of Israel off the map - is constructed by Israel’s PM in materialistic terms, 
and as a realistic threat to Israel’s existence: 
“Not only is he saying these things [wiping Israel off the map], but, as we all 
know, he is making enormous efforts to possess of non-conventional 
weapons, with delivery systems that may implement –  that have the capacity 
of implementing that which he foresees for the future of the State of Israel 
and the Jewish people.” 
   
The enormous efforts to possess of non-conventional weapons are a reference to 
Iran’s “nuclear threat”. The delivery systems are a reference to Iran’s advancing 
missile program35. And all Together, the “nuclear threat”, combing with a delivery 
system, is presented as a realistic threat to Israel’s existence; nuclear warheads 
                                                 
35 See on Iran’s delivery capabilities: a document by CSIS; “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons? Iran’s Missiles and 
Possible Delivery System’s (accessed: 03.06.2008) [online]. URL - 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060417_irandelivsystem.pdf  
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that, according to Israel’s PM, have the capacity of implementing that which he 
[Ahmadinejad] foresees for the future of the State of Israel and the Jewish people 
[to wipe the existence of the State of Israel off the map]. 
     Iran’s incitement is being coded by “official Israel” (represented here by 
Israel’s PM) in materialistic means and as a realistic alternative; a codification of 
the “Iranian threat” in both materialistic and identity means that associates Iran’s 
nuclear program with Iran’s communicated aspiration (to wipe the existence of the 
State of Israel off the map). As a result, Iran is presented, in Israel, as “existential 
threat”; an existential threat that tends to be associated with no less then the 
traumatic event of the Holocaust. 
Siege Mentality  
As we saw above, the reconstruction of the memory of the Holocaust, in 
contemporary frame of reference, is done, by Israel’s PM, in such a hectic way 
that might point on a genuine pessimistic world view, or, on the other hand, on a 
political interest to manipulate a threat for political mobilization. Those can be 
only assumed, but, whatever the reason might be, it is of evidence that Israel’s PM 
is mobilizing a very specific codification of the “Iranian threat”. He codifies the 
“Iranian threat” in terms of a realistic “existential threat”; a pessimistic world view 
that might be accounted for in terms of siege mentality.  
     Not only that the PM reconstructs the collective memory of the Holocaust in 
contemporary frame of reference (as a very important preparation for what we yet 
have at present, and may have to deal with in the future) the contemporary threat 
is exemplified, by the PM, in terms of ’real – materialistic – capabilities’ (a 
“nuclear threat”). If not explicit enough, the acute of the contemporary “existential 
threat” (as constructed by Israel’s PM) and its parallelization with the memory of 
the Holocaust, the next presented quote should clarify it all:      
“Learning about the Holocaust is not learning of remote history – of what 
happened to the Jewish people.  On these very days, we hear voices which 
echo those which started straight across the world in the ‘30s.” 
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In two sentences, Israel’s PM most coherently articulates the revival of Holocaust-
related-themes in contemporary terms. The PM paralyzes the voices which echo in 
present days, from Teheran, to those which echo[ed], from Europe, in the ‘30s 
(Nazi ideology). Such equalization - which is accompanied with coherent 
visualization of the contemporary threat from Iran through probabilistic 
materialistic capabilities (non-conventional weapons, with delivery systems) - 
might clearly indicate on a very pessimistic world view.  
     Moreover, high sensitivity to information is another sociocognitive 
characterization of the mentality of siege that can be helpful for interpreting the 
context of the speech. As presented, information that comes from the outside 
world might be presented as evidence for reaffirming the already constitutive 
perception of the negative intentions of the world. Indeed, the discourse is being 
used not only as evidence for reaffirming the already constitutive perception of the 
negative intentions of Iran, but, as evidence for reaffirming the constitutive 
perception of the negative intentions of the world; a constitutive perception of 
‘blame’ that, following the traditional tendency of his predecessors, is being 
instrumentalized as an ‘appeal’ to the world conscience. 
Appeal of Blame to the World Conscience  
The historical world ‘ignores’ from the Nazi communicated incitement is 
associated to today’s ‘ignores’ to Iran’s communicated incitement. According to 
Israel’s PM, we experience today the similar voices of incitement (as mobilized by 
the Nazi Regime) and, in a repetitive cycle of history, we witness the similar 
ignores by the world.  
     A more instrumentalize mobilization of ‘blame’, to the world conscience, soon 
follows:  
“[T]his nation [Iran] continues to be a legitimate member of the United 
Nations, and leaders of many countries in the world receive the leader that 
speaks publicly, officially and openly about the liquidation of the State of 
Israel, and they hardly do anything.” 
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The instrumental logic behind the mobilization of ‘blame’ to the world conscience 
can be well assumed from the quotation above. Israel’s PM coherently calls to 
illegitimatize Iran’s membership at the United Nations; to boycott Iran; and to 
‘act’ against the contemporary threat to Jewish existent (as represented here by 
Iran).  
Giving-Up on the World Conscience  
A pessimistic world view is well visualized by the PM parallelization of the 
“Iranian threat” with the apocalyptic event of the Holocaust, and his interpretation 
of the international community reaction (they [leaders of many countries in the 
world] hardly do anything). 
      The realization that nothing good can be expected from the ‘rest of the world’ 
is the common Israeli perception of the nations of the world (Bar – Tal & 
Teichman 2005, p.97); nations that, due to their bureaucratic and administrative 
assistance to transport their Jewish communities to their destiny in the east (the 
concentration camps), are commonly presented in Israel as “evil, immoral, 
utilitarian, indifferent, and often brutal” (p.97). Such post-traumatic sociocognitive 
beliefs are explained by the theorization of the siege mentality; a mentality of 
siege that constructs deep mistrust of the world intentions. Deep mistrust that can 
be well interpreted in the current speech:  
Most countries heard the incitement by the Nazi Regime and did not do 
anything and now; when similar voices are raising again (this time from 
Iran), the inciting country (Iran) continues to be a legitimate member of the 
United Nations and leaders of many countries in the world… hardly do 
anything. 
     Such pessimistic construction of meaning, by Israel’s highest authority, might 
construct the apprehension (domestically in Israel) that Israel will stay alone in 
front of a hostile regional power (Iran), which introduces, according to the Israeli 
political discourse, new pattern of hostilities - this time in the shape of a “nuclear 
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weapon”. Indeed, as will be seen next, the PM makes it clear that “we” (Israel), 
due to the immoral nature of the world (as presented above), will “have to deal 
with [the “Iranian threat”] … in the near future”.         
Israel’s Implied Threat  
A routine official speech by an Israeli PM, in an unveiling plaque event, becomes 
a pessimistic presentation of Israel’s “existential threat”; in the shape of Iran’s 
“nuclear threat” and its calls to wipe Israel off the map. Like the previous 
presented speech of the PM, in Germany, where much attention was given to 
Israel’s position of power (as a reminder: [d]oomed are they who remain 
complacent and do not prepare themselves to thwart the danger) this speech 
constructs Israel’s position of power, as well.  
     Due to the comparison between Iran and Nazi Germany, and the nature of the 
dominate narrative of the Holocaust (never-again: Jewish blood would never be 
abandoned or defenseless again), Israel’s PM constructs a coherent message that 
can well be interpreted in militarized terms:  
“[I]t is not only history that we have to learn, but also how to derive the 
necessary conclusions in order to be able to cope with what we have to deal 
with at the present time and in the near future.”      
 
To contextualize Israel’s necessary conclusions and means to cope with the 
“existential threat” (as presented in the quotation above); for better understanding 
the urgency of defusing the destructive relations between those regional powers 
(Israel and Iran); and for better understanding the political discourse, I find it 
crucial to describe a few statements, by Israel’s PM, that followed the presented 
speech:  
• In an interview to a German TV station, approximately six weeks after the 
Yad-Vashem speech and one day ahead of the Grünwald speech, Israel’s PM 
referred to the “Iranian threat” and said: “[c]an you see that is the same level 
when you are aspiring to have a nuclear weapon as America, France, Israel 
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and Russia?”36. The remark stimulated a debate both in Israel and by the 
world media. Did Olmert violate the ambiguousness nuclear policy by 
admitting that Israel possesses nuclear weapons? Was it a ‘slip of the 
tongue’ or a calculated concealed threat again Iran (implying on Israel’s 
nuclear capabilities)?  
  
• Days before Olmert calculated or miscalculated ‘slip of the tongue’ the 
following headline was published in Haaretz: “Olmert declines to rule out 
military action against Iran”37. In an interview to a German magazine (the 
Der Spiegel) when asked about the prospect of a military strike against Iran 
the PM replied: “I rule nothing out”. Moreover, the PM criticized (as it was 
presented in Haaretz) “the international community's hesitation in dealing 
with Ahmadinejad” and mobilized the following message in his 
communication with the international community: “I expect significantly 
more dramatic steps to be taken. Here is a leader who says openly that it is 
his aim to wipe Israel off the map. Israel is a member of the United 
Nations… That someone says such a thing these days is absolutely 
criminal”.  
 
Hopefully, the statements by the PM (that were mobilized ahead of his trip to 
Germany and the Grünwald speech) help to put Israel’s necessary conclusions and 
means to cope with the “Iranian threat” in context. The means to cope with the 
threat can be interpreted by the PM ‘slip of the tongue’ in a very hectic way, as 
nuclear means. And, either conventional or not, the PM in his own words did not 
rule out a military act (I rule nothing out). Those highly communicated statements 
points on the habitual tendency to communicate the victimhood of the Holocaust 
from a position of power, sovereignty, and control. A tendency that is rooted in the 
consciousness-changing event of the Eichmann trial and might be well interpreted 
                                                 
36 Ynet.com, 12.12.2006, AP and Ynet ;”Olmert: Iran wants nuclear weapons like Israel”  (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3338783,00.html  
37 Haaretz.com, 09.12.2006, by news agencies; “Olmert declines to rule out military action against Iran” 
(accessed: 08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/798736.html    
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by three of Bar-Tal’s (1998) eight themes for describing the societal beliefs of a 
society that is coping with intractable conflict. 
     The societal beliefs about security are legitimized (all means to cope with the 
threat are justified (I rule nothing out)) by the ‘lesson’ of the Holocaust (Jewish 
blood would never be abandoned or defenseless again). The threat (in this case 
Iran) is dehumanized, through adversary's delegitimization, and compared to no 
less then the Nazi evil, and this communicative tactics increasing, in return, the 
justness of one's own goals under the “existential” circumstances.  
     I presented above the discursive tendency of Israel’s PM through two speeches. 
The findings clearly indicate on the tendency to associate the memory of the 
Holocaust, through its constitutive narratives, with a contemporary threat (in this 
case: the “Iranian threat”). However, the incorporation of the memory of the 
Holocaust, in the speeches, is some what expected, due to the symbolic magnitude 
of the speeches (both were given at Holocaust commemorative sites (Yad Vashem 
and the Grünwald platform)). I would therefore like to explore next if the same 
discursive tendency might be detected in a speech that was given in the U.S.: a 
‘Holocaust neutral’ location.    
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Israel’s Prime Minister in the U.S.  
The next interpretation is from a speech that was given in the most influential 
annual event of the United Jewish Communities (UJC) General Assembly in LA38 
(November 14, 2006). Also here, Israel’s PM chose to instrumentalize the 
traumatic memory of the Holocaust, in contemporary frame of reference, and to 
directly relate it to the “Iranian threat”.  
The Slogan 
     As an ‘appetizer’, for the presentation and interpretation of the relevant content 
from the speech, I would like to highlight and interpret one sentence that most 
coherently represents (to my opinion) the essence of Israel’s official discourse 
concerning Iran; a political discourse that seems to be rooted in what Zertal 
referred to as Israel’s “culture of death”, because it intimately relates to a 
traumatic memory that is being revived in contemporary frame of reference. 
We cannot tolerate – we will not tolerate – those who challenge Israel’s right to 
exist while actively seeking to develop the catastrophic weapons to fulfill their 
goals 
 
In line with the presented contextualization of the constitutive legacy of the 
Holocaust discourses, this sentence can be regarded as a constitutive slogan that 
symbolizes Israel’s political discourse regarding any “existential threat”, but, in 
this case, it explicitly refers to the “Iranian threat”; a contemporary “existential 
threat” that in line with the presented “cutting edge of constructivist research” 
(Gourevitch 2002, p.319), which emphasizes the nature of norms and identities but 
do not deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour (such as military abilities), 
is visualizes in both ‘ideological means’ (challenging Israel’s right to exist) and 
‘materialistic means’ (develop the catastrophic weapons to fulfill their goals).  
                                                 




     Hopefully, the traditional tendency of Holocaust themes - to appear in periods 
of crises - becomes visible in the analysis up until now. It was Egypt that 
represented “existential threat” in the Israeli political discourse in the 60’Th and 
stimulated, in return, Holocaust associations. Apparently, nowadays, the 
“existential threat” is represented by Iran, stimulating, in a repetitive manner, 
Holocaust associations (as it is represented here by Israel’s PM). Accordingly, the 
cited sentence can be perceived as a slogan that circulates in time and place; a 
repetitive theme in the Israeli political discourse that is mobilized here (by Israel’s 
PM) in regards to the “Iranian threat”.  
     Following the Eichmann legacy the existential issue (Israel’s right to exist) is 
communicated from a position of power, sovereignty, and control. A constitutive 
legacy that is clearly evidential in the PM slogan: [w]e cannot tolerate – we will 
not tolerate – those who challenge Israel’s right to exist. And, as will be 
described, is mobilized to the international community.  
Unifying Victimization  
In his highly communicated speech in front of the UJC Israel’s PM chose to point 
on the unity between Israel and the Diaspora; imaginary unity that revive around 
historic victimhood.  
“Throughout our history, when others expected us to cast our faith into 
darkness and despair, we have always been guided by the miracle of light.”  
 
Israel’s PM is clearly attempting to construct a sense of unity between the 
Diaspora and Israel. He talks about a common history (our history) and common 
faith (our faith), and he presents it in a positive self image; a positive self image of 
a society that is being guided by no less than the miracle of light. Clearly, the most 
positive self image is constructed and is being intensified through the 
delegitimization of the ‘other’. The PM constructs a contrast between light and 
darkness, between ‘our’ miracle of light and the ‘other’ attempt (throughout … 
history) to cast our faith into darkness and despair.  
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     It is functional for a society that is involved in intractable conflict to perceive 
itself as the victim. It contributes to the domestic sense of justice, increases 
solidarity, and provides moral justification to oppose the adversary (Bar-Tal 1998, 
p.12-13). Accordingly, we can clearly see how the Jewish people are presented by 
as victims to malicious attempts by the ‘others’ to cast our [the Jewish people] 
faith into darkness and despair. Following Wendt & Fearon’s (2002) theorization 
that international level understanding depends on social and cultural domestic 
understanding I find this sort of construction of meaning, by Israel’s PM, as 
valuable for better understanding Israel’s communication in the international 
arena. 
A Victorious form of Defeatism  
Although that Israel’s PM tends to mobilize and codify the victimization of the 
Jewish people as a source of common destiny. Following the structural paradox of 
the victim-community, also in this speech, the victimhood is represented in a 
victorious way. 
     In the next presented quote the structural paradox of the victim-community can 
be well visualized:  
“Once before, calls to wipe out the Jewish people were appeased by the 
community of nations. Once before, but never again.”  
 
The Jewish people are presented as the ‘optimal victims’: the calls [and attempts] 
to wipe out their existence were appeased by the world (the community of 
nations). The victimhood, as it is presented by Israel’s PM, is absolute; it is not 
‘only’ a limited victimhood by one perpetrator but victimhood that is embraced by 
the community of nations (or all countries of the world as it was presented by him 
at the Grünwald speech (indicating on the tendency to blame the consequences of 
the Holocaust not only on Nazi Germany but on all of its collaborators)).  
     However, this is the legacy of the defeated ‘old Jew’; the legacy of the 
Diaspora, and although that this legacy is well communicated it is presented also 
in this speech from a position of power. The calls to wipe out the Jewish people 
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are presented as the defeated legacy of the past (Once before) and as a contrast to 
Israel’s position of power and sovereignty. Modern attempts to wipe out the 
Jewish people will not go undefiance, declares Israel’s PM and articulated it 
through one of the most constitutive narratives of the Holocaust: never again. 
Israel, as the discourse says, was reborn from the ashes of defeat; it has learned the 
lesson from the total victimization (as it is represented by the event of the 
Holocaust); and it will therefore use all means of its power to overcome the 
victimizer, which apparently circulates in relation to time in place.          
Beautiful Death  
Israel’s second war in Lebanon is presented as “Iran’s war”. And, in accordance to 
Bar-Tal (1998) category of adversary's delegitimization, the war is described as a 
war that was enforced on Israel by “wanton aggression started by Hizbullah and 
fueled by… hate”. Moreover, in contrast to the adversary’s wanton aggression and 
hate Israel’s forces are described in the most patriotic way as the “brave soldiers 
of the IDF [Israel Defense Army]… who volunteered in unprecedented numbers, 
fought with resilience and heroism… fought without fear, hesitance or self-
consideration”. Clearly, through such a contrast (between ‘us’ and the ‘other’), 
societal beliefs about the justness of one's own goals, and a collective sense of 
unity, are constructed by Israel’s PM.  
     The PM communication can be interpreted as a thematic construction that is 
originated in the constitutive narrative of power and renewal. Following the 
tendency of his predecessors, Israel’s highest authority constructs in contemporary 
terms (represented here by the second Lebanon war) the myth of the ‘new Jew’. 
The figure of the ‘new Jew’ (the brave soldiers of the IDF) is represented here as a 
heroic type, that will choose a “beautiful death” of self defense and heroism 
(fought without fear, hesitance or self-consideration) instead of the ‘humiliating’ 
alternative of ‘death which is not beautiful at all’ (as represented by the 
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victimhood of the Holocaust (‘went like sheep to the slaughter’)). This discursive 
tendency is clearly rotted in the constitutive narrative of power and renewal. 
The Intimidating Consequences from the World Apathy  
As presented, up until now, we can clearly detect the overlapping of discourses. 
Israel’s PM reconstructs the defeated legacy of the Jewish people victimhood. 
Nevertheless, following the legacy of the Eichmann trial and the constitutive 
narrative of the power and renewal, he constructs it (the victimhood) in a 
victorious way. Both frames are constructed simultaneously, but they are 
mobilized for different purposes. The victimhood is mobilized as an ‘appeal’ to 
the world conscience; to stimulate the world into action (against Iran), whereas 
Israel’s position of power is mobilized, simultaneously, as a sort of warning to the 
path of un-united front, by the international community, against Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions; an ‘un-united front’ that will have (according to Israel’s PM) grim 
consequences:  
“If Iran achieves the ability to produce nuclear weapons… we will enter a 
new era of instability unlike any the world has ever seen.”  
 
The following four sections may help to clarify this sort of communication:  
1) “No longer can the international community afford to hesitate, contemplate 
or waver in its dealing with this defiant state. No longer can we allow Iran to 
defer the demands of the international community without consequence. 
 
We cannot tolerate – we will not tolerate – those who challenge Israel’s right 
to exist while actively seeking to develop the catastrophic weapons to fulfill 
their goals.”  
 
Same like the Holocaust-related slogan of never-again so is no longer a Holocaust-
related slogan. In a historical continuity of discourses the world hesitation, 
contemplation and wavering from the Nazi threat is revived in contemporary 
frame of reference for scoring debating points in the Israeli Iranian conflict and for 
urging the international community to ‘take a stand’ in the Iranian issue (No 
longer can we allow Iran to defer the demands of the international community 
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without consequences). The interpretation of the frame no longer, in the context of 
the sentence, is coherently articulated by Israel’s PM: the alternative to a renewal 
hesitation, contemplation and wavering by the international community, from 
taking a stand against the contemporary threat to the Jewish existence (as 
represented by Iran’s calls to wipe out the Jewish people), will not be tolerate by 
the state of Israel, due to the legacy of the past (the Holocaust).  
     Israel’s PM mobilizes a very coherent message to the international community: 
“we” (the Jewish people) have learned the lesson (from the world hesitation) and 
will therefore not tolerate contemporary challenge[s] to Israel’s right to exist.    
 
2) “We have reached the pivotal moment of truth regarding Iran. 
 
It would be an unbearable sin to future generations to allow Iran to obtain 
nuclear weapons. What would we tell our children? How can we justify not 
preventing this catastrophic event? If Iran achieves the ability to produce 
nuclear weapons, as we know it is seeking to do, we will enter a new era of 
instability unlike any the world has ever seen. We cannot afford to wait. We 
must all speak with one voice.” 
 
Typical to a defeated mentality of siege, also here, a very pessimistic world view 
is of evidence. The unbearable sin to future generations (to allow Iran to obtain 
nuclear weapons) is presented in the most urgent terms (we have reached the 
pivotal moment of truth regarding Iran). With those associations Israel’s PM 
mobilizes an ‘appeal’ to the world conscience (the community of nations). He 
poetically asks: [w]hat would we tell our children? How can we justify not 
preventing this catastrophic event?  
     In line with the constitutive lesson from the Holocaust, Jewish blood would 
never be abandoned or defenseless again, those are rhetoric questions that are 
meant to intensify the conclusion:  
If Iran achieves the ability to produce nuclear weapons… we will enter a 
new era of instability unlike any the world has ever seen. 
     Following the structural paradox of the victim-community (as previously 
presented), the associated victimhood of a new catastrophic event is 
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communicated from a position of power, sovereignty, and control. Unlike the 
defeated tendency of the Diaspora, and from Israel’s position of relevant power, 
the implications from a renewal ‘hesitation’ by the international community (as 
was experienced in the Holocaust) will bear the most destructive consequences (a 
new era of instability unlike any the world has ever seen). Following the legacy of 
the Eichmann trial, and correlating with the theory of the victim-community, the 
victimhood of the Holocaust is well communicated, but it is communicated 
instrumentally from a position of power, sovereignty, and control.  
 
3) “America's leadership in preventing Iran's nuclearization is indisputable and 
unequaled… President George W. Bush in Washington. Believe me, he is a 
great friend to the State of Israel… His determination to prevent this most 
serious of developments is unquestionable. But America must have the 
support of the international community if we are to successfully defuse this 
mortal threat [appeal].” 
 
Israel’s PM makes an undistinguished link between Israel and the U.S. regarding 
their positions on the Iranian issue (America's leadership in preventing Iran's 
nuclearization is indisputable). However, due to America’s dependency on the 
international community position on the issue (But America must have the support 
of the international community if we are to successfully defuse this mortal threat) 
its friendship to Israel (he [Bush] is a great friend to the State of Israel) is 
presented with much skepticism. 
     The international community hesitation in the past event of the Holocaust is 
constructed coded and framed in relation to a contemporary event: the Iranian 
issue; indicating, in return, on the cultural traumatic nature of the collective 
memory of the Holocaust domestically in Israel. Due to America’s reliance on the 
international community support (the same international community that 
administratively and passively assisted to the implementation of the final solution) 
America’s determination, to prevent this most serious of developments (Iran’s 
nuclearization), is conditioned and confined with much skepticism by the 
instrumentalized uses of the preposition BUT.  
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 4) “Our actions will be measured by results, not intentions. Our integrity will 
remain intact only if we prevent Iran's devious goals, not if we try our best 
but fail. Our generation will be judged by its ability to ensure peace and 
security, not by its failure to stand up to the most challenging of threats. We 
did not choose this responsibility. But the burden is ours.  We cannot, we will 
not, we shall not shy away from confronting this challenge [Power].  
 
Once before, calls to wipe out the Jewish people were appeased by the 
community of nations. Once before, but never again.” 
 
Constituted in the traumatic memory of the Holocaust is deep mistrust about the 
world intentions, a sociocognitive characteristic of mentality of siege that can be 
visualized through Israel’s PM construction of meaning. After mobilizing much 
doubt and pessimistic skepticism, concerning the world determination to unite 
against the Iranian “nuclear threat”, Israel’s PM concludes, the Iranian section in 
his speech, with a domestic appeal that can be also interpreted as an ‘appeal’ to the 
international community.    
     Israel’s PM paints a gloomy picture of how the Jewish people will probably be 
left alone (yet again) in a hostile world: [w]e did not choose this responsibility. 
But the burden is ours. Israel is presented, again, in a heroic frame as the ‘last line 
of defense’ for preventing Iran’s devious goals and/or to stand up to the most 
challenging of threats. From such a distinction between ‘us’ (those who seek to 
ensure peace and security) and the ‘other’ (Iran’s devious goals) the PM 
constructs societal beliefs about security and justness of one's own goals. And, 
from Israel’s position of sovereignty and relevant power, Israel’s highest authority 
concludes with a sentence that can not be interpreted other than an expression that 
articulates a probability to confrontation:  
We cannot, we will not, we shall not shy away from confronting this 
challenge.      
     Finally, in accordance with the theorization of the cultural trauma, where past 
traumatic events tend to be associated with contemporary events, Israel’s PM 
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associates, in the most coherently manner, the lesson of the collective memory of 
the Holocaust with the current crisis of Iran: 
“Once before, calls to wipe out the Jewish people were appeased by the 
community of nations. Once before, but never again.” 
  
The collective memory of the Holocaust is evidently being revived, by Israel’s 
PM, in contemporary frame of reference. In an ‘appeal’ to the world conscience 
Israel’s PM reminds the world that their appeasement with Nazi Germany is a 
constitutive lesson in Israel. However, this is the defeated legacy of the 
defenseless Diaspora. In view of that, Israel’s PM mobilizes the constitutive 
slogan of the Holocaust (in Israel): never again. Israel’s PM makes it clear that 
modern attempts to wipe out the Jewish people (as represented here by the 
“Iranian threat”) will suffer the most apocalyptic consequences (we will enter a 
new era of instability unlike any the world has ever seen). 
 
Summary 
I portrayed in chapter four the traditional tendency of the traumatic memory of the 
Holocaust to revive in the Israeli discourse in periods of crises. In view of that, I 
assumed that the same tendency takes place in the current crisis with Iran. In order 
to validate this assumption, I opened with an indepth discourse analysis of three 
speeches, by Israel’s PM. The findings clearly indicate, on the “overlapping” and 
“historical continuity” of the discourses, pointing on their stability over time. In 
line with the tendency of his predecessors, Israel’s current PM interrelates the 
social category of the Holocaust in contemporary frame of reference; a repeated 
tendency to associate Holocaust-related-themes with contemporary threats to 
Jewish existent, which highlights the relevance of the theorization of “cultural 
trauma” in the interpretation of Israel’s communication in the current crisis with 
Iran.  
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     In more abstract terms, Israel’s PM tendency - to associate the contemporary 
Iranian issue with the historic event of the Holocaust - highlights the relevance of 
domestic norms and identities understandings in order to better understand 
international phenomena. In this case, very hectic norms and identities are 
communicated by Israel’s PM. A hectic tendency that is ‘stimulated’ by Iran’s 
maximization of power (its nuclear program) and its incitement, and can therefore 
correlate, to my opinion, with Kaufmann’s (2001) presented theorization that: 
“[h]ostile and fear rise as a result of symbolic events that activate the myths, such 
as … a leader explicitly manipulating symbols”.  
     In view of that, states communication ought to be analyzed domestically in such 
a manner that will uncover their nature of norms and identities. A supplementary 
perspective that does not deny crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour that 
characterizes much of the international politics scholarship. Indeed, we saw in the 
political discourse (as it is constructed by Israel’s PM) the appearance of concepts 
like power seeking states (Iran’s nuclearization). Therefore, I chose an approach 
that does not deny the existence of a materialist phenomenal world, external to 
thoughts, but theoretically stresses that practices such as norms and identities can 
constitute themselves as objects of knowledge that should therefore be studied for 
interpretive purpose. Interpretive purpose that hopefully revealed, how the social 
category of the collective memory of the Holocaust, is revived in contemporary 
terms, and how it “overlaps” with theories that relates to the constitutive origins of 
the collective memory of the Holocaust, and/or to the sociocognitive implications 
from such a collective trauma. 
     My findings clearly indicate that Israel’s PM mobilizes his construction of 
meaning in line with the already constitutive narratives of the Holocaust memory. 
Firstly, in line with the constitutive narrative of Zionism (power and renewal), 
Israel’s PM manages to construct victorious frames from the horrific defeat of the 
Holocaust. The Holocaust is presented as the defeated legacy of the ‘old Jews’ and 
in contrast to Israel, which is presented by him as a new form of existence; a new 
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form of existence that did not only overcame the Nazi perpetrator but will 
overcome any contemporary threats to Jewish existence (represented by him as the 
“Iranian threat”). Secondly, the “consciousness-changing event” of the Eichmann 
trial constructs the habitual tendency to communicate the victimhood of the 
Holocaust from a position of power, sovereignty, and control. Indeed, the 
traumatic memory of the Holocaust is constructed, by the PM, as a metaphor of 
absolute victimhood, in order to intensify and highlight the constitutive lesson of 
the Holocaust. A lesson that is based on the constitutive lesson from the Holocaust 
(that was first introduced in the Eichmann trial): never-again.  
     By relating and associating the historical legacies of the Holocaust with a 
contemporary threat (the “Iranian threat”) Israel’s PM communicates with the 
‘beaten conscience’ of the world (reminding them their moralist obligation to the 
Jewish existent). However, at the same time, following the mentality of siege, 
Israel views the nations of the world as “evil, immoral, utilitarian, indifferent, and 
often brutal” (Bar – Tal & Teichman 2005, p.97). It was highly evidential in the 
PM communication. Deep mistrust about the world intentions is constructed. As 
evidence, the ‘appeal’ to the world conscience is constructed with much doubt and 
with what I referred to as an implied threat. Israel’s PM makes it clear that Jewish 
blood would never be abandoned or defenseless again, and if the world will not 
unite against the “threat” (Iran) the implications will be catastrophic. 
     The extensive use of Holocaust-related-themes must have some sociocognitive 
emotional affect on the Israeli society; sociocognitive emotional affect that, 
according to Zertal, is influencing towards a “culture of death” in the Israeli 
society. Indeed, as presented in the chapter four, Israel’s collective memory of the 
Holocaust (or “collective memory of death and trauma” as defined by Zertal 
(2005, p.1)) traditionally tended to be “produced, processed, coded, and put to use 
in Israel's public space” (p.1), in periods of crises. From this perspective, the 
findings above clearly point on identical tendency in the contemporary crisis with 
Iran. It is of evidence that Israel’s highest authority chose to produce, process, 
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code, and put to use the collective memory of the Holocaust in Israel’s public 
sphere, in direct relation to a contemporary threat: the “Iranian threat”.   
     However, although that Israel’s highest authority instrumentilzation of the 
collective memory of Holocaust, in contemporary frame of reference and in direct 
relation to the “existential Iranian threat”, may visualize, to some extent, the way 
in which Israel’s political sphere derives some formative and normative impulses 
from the fateful memory of the Holocaust. Israel’s PM does not, and can not, 
represent the political discourse as a whole (relatively speaking).  
     Therefore, I would like to explore, in the next chapter, if the construction of 
meaning of Israel’s PM, as portrayed above, can be authenticate by other 
influential politicians (that take an active part in Israel’s political sphere and 
referred to the Iranian issue in the regarded frame of time). Does Israel’s PM 
evidential tendency, to communicate the collective memory of the Holocaust in 
relation with the current crisis with Iran; is the tendency of other influential 
collective agents? Can identical themes (Holocaust-related), which were mobilized 






6 The Discursive Tendency of Key Political 
Figures 
 
In this section I would like to explore if Israel’s PM discursive tendency, to 
communicate the collective memory of the Holocaust in line with the constitutive 
narratives of the Holocaust memory; to reconstruct the memory of the Holocaust 
in contemporary frame of reference; and to directly associate the “Iranian threat” 
with the “Nazi evil”, is the tendency of other political collective agents. Does the 
PM construction of meaning (as presented in the previous chapter) represent the 
Israeli political discourse concerning Iran?  
     For that purpose, I will present relating statements, which were mobilized, in 
the same frame of time, and communicated on the same issue (the “Iranian 
threat”), by leading Israeli political figures, and explore their correspondence with 
the PM communication. My aim here is to identify and to visualize the assumed 
stability of the political discourse, as constructed by Israel’s PM. I chose for this 
task three political figures that, due to their contemporary status in the Israeli 
political sphere, might well construct a political discourse and influence, to some 
extent, Israel’s behavior in the international arena. Two of them, Tzipi Livni 
(Israel’s acting PM and Minister of foreign affairs) and Shimon Peres (vice 
premier in the regarded frame of time (2006), and the ninth President of the State 
of Israel in his current position), are most dominant political figures in the PM 
political party (Kadima), which consequently, toke and take an active role in 
‘navigating’ the Israeli political system. And, finally, in order to portray the 
political discourse in more general terms, I will conclude with Benjamin 
Netanyahu which, due to his status as an opposition leader, might present an 
alternative discourse.    
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The Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Tzipi Livni is Israel’s acting PM, foreign affairs Minister (FM), and a leading 
member of kadima party (Heb.: progress party). She is a dominant political figure 
in Israel’s current political sphere, and following the description of collective 
agents (agents who are based in particular places in the social structure and have 
the ability to construct “meaning” in the public sphere (Alexander 2004: p.11)), 
her construction of meaning should be of value for describing the official political 
discourse  in Israel. 
The gas chambers stand as silent proof of the horrors 
1) In Israel’s parliament, one month before the “Holocaust conference” in Teheran 
(November 12, 2006), Israel’s FM (Tzipi Livni) directly referred to the 
“conference” as followed:39  
“No one can erase the horror, the evil, the piles of hair, the mass graves, the 
numbers on people’s arms, the humiliation, and the human experimentation – 
no one has the power to erase all this.The gas chambers stand as silent proof 
of the horrors. Everyone who arrives sees the fingernail scratches on the 
concrete, scratches of people who only had those fingernails to scratch the 
concrete – scratched which are engraved in our hearts and souls. 
I am not here to prove that the Holocaust existed here in Israel, but rather to 
take advantage of the stage I have been given, here in Israel's Knesset, in 
order to call on the entire world to understand that what is happening in 
Tehran is not only Israel and the Jewish world's problem, but rather the 
problem of anyone who supports the values of the free world.  
The memory of the Holocaust is crucial for the entire international community, 
and not only for Israel and the Jewish people. By denying the Holocaust, 
Iran's president is seeking to create legitimacy for his declared intentions to 
annihilate Israel and spread his radical doctrine which contradicts the values 
of the free world.” 
 
Following the constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial, which (as shown) is in 
constant use by Israel’s PM, Israel’s FM mobilized, as well, a highly emotional 
appeal to the international community, and she did so from a position of power 
and control: the position of Israel’s sovereignty. 
                                                 
39 Ynet.com, 12.11.06, breaking-news; “Livni: Impossible to erase pain of Holocaust victims” (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3338775,00.html  
 84
     The absolute victimhood of the Holocaust, the mass graves; the human 
experimentation; and the gas chambers, are most poetically and intensely 
articulated by the FM (e.g. the fingernail scratches on the concrete [of the gas 
chambers], scratches of people who only had those fingernails to scratch the 
concrete), emphasizing the extent of the Holocaust trauma and its fundamental 
nature in Israel’s sense of identity. The event of the Holocaust, according to the 
FM, is engraved in our [Israel’s] hearts and souls, articulating it as a cultural 
traumatic memory domestically in Israel. 
     The memory of the Holocaust is being revived by Israel’s FM in contemporary 
frame of reference and in direct relation to the Iranian crisis: [b]y denying the 
Holocaust, Iran's president is seeking to create legitimacy for his declared 
intentions to annihilate Israel and spread his radical doctrine which contradicts 
the values of the free world. 
     The “Iranian threat” is presented as an “existential threat” to Israel, and as an 
international threat to the values of the free world. The ‘appeal’ to the world 
conscience is constructed in the same tendency as it was described up until now. 
Iran is represented as a state who seeks to annihilate Israel, and, therefore, due to 
the world beaten conscience (from the annihilation of Europe Jewry), the ‘appeal’ 
is expected to be of greater magnitude. 
We know the lessons of the past 
2) In a speech at the UN General Assembly (September 21, 2006) Israel’s FM 
mobilized the following messages:40 
* “There is no greater challenge to our values than that posed by the leaders 
of Iran… They deny and mock the Holocaust. They speak proudly and openly 
of their desire to wipe Israel off the map. And now, by their actions, they 
pursue the weapons to achieve this objective, to imperil the region and to 
threaten the world.” 
                                                 
40 *The first quote: Haaretz.com, 21.09.06, Shlomo Shamir; “Livni: Iran poses greatest threat to world's 
values” (accessed: 08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/765545.html      
*The second quote: Ynet.com, 21.09.06, Ynet; “Livni: World faces moment of truth over Iran issue” 




* “We know the lessons of the past. We know the consequences of 
appeasement and indifference. There is no place for such leaders in this 
forum. There is no place for such a regime in the family of nations.”  
 
Same like Israel’s PM presented ‘slogan’ concerning the “Iranian threat” (We 
cannot tolerate – we will not tolerate – those who challenge Israel’s right to exist 
while actively seeking to develop the catastrophic weapons to fulfill their goals),  
that articulates the tension between the ‘ideological threat’ (challenging Israel’s 
right to exist) and the ‘materialistic threat’ (develop the catastrophic weapons). 
Also here, the ideological descriptions of the “Iranian threat” (They deny and mock 
the Holocaust. They speak proudly and openly of their desire to wipe Israel off the 
map) is intensified and realized by a materialistic description (they pursue the 
weapons to achieve this objective). Constructing it, in return, as an “existential 
threat”: 
There is no greater challenge to our values than that posed by the leaders 
of Iran   
     In the second quote, a clear ‘appeal’ to the world conscience can be visualized 
yet again. The lesson of the Holocaust (never-again) is instrumentally mobilized 
here to the world: We know the lessons of the past. We know the consequences of 
appeasement and indifference. There is no place for such leaders in this forum. 
There is no place for such a regime in the family of nations.  
     This most coherent message is articulated by a high rank Israeli policy maker 
(Israel’s FM) in an internationally communicated event, at the UN General 
Assembly. The most constitutive narrative of the Holocaust (never-again) is 
directly mobilized to the world conscience. And, ‘armed’ with this normative 
perception, an instrumental requirement is mobilized: [t]here is no place for such 
a regime in the family of nations.  
The promise of "never again" 
3) At the same UJC General Assembly conference (from where I presented the 
third speech by Israel’s PM) Israel’s FM argued, as well, for a decisive action 
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against Iran, justifying it, in what can be identified now as a repetitive tendency, 
with the most constitutive Holocaust slogan: never-again:41 
 
“We face a regime that denies and mocks the Holocaust while seeking the 
weapons to perpetrate one. Iran's words and actions are not only a direct 
threat to Israel, but they are no less a threat to the values that the 
international community as a whole claims to hold dear… If these values 
mean anything - if the promise of "never again" is more important than the 
price of oil - then the time for international indifference and hesitation in the 
face of the Iranian threat has long passed.” 
 
The constitutive lesson of the Holocaust (never-again) is articulated here and 
mobilized to the world ‘beaten conscience’ with a sense of blame and cynicism: if 
the promise of "never again" is more important than the price of oil- then the time 
for international indifference and hesitation in the face of the Iranian threat has 
long passed. Not only that the contemporary threat to Jewish existent, a regime 
[Iran] that… seeking the weapons to perpetrate one [a Holocaust], is associated 
with the memory of the Holocaust, it is most specifically and instrumentally 
associated with the dominate narrative of the Holocaust never again (Jewish blood 
would never be abandoned or defenseless again).  
     Moreover, the “Iranian threat” is described in the most urgent terms as an 
immediate threat that must be dealt with without hesitation (the time… has long 
passed). And also here, the ideological threat is backed by materialistic realization 
of the threat: [w]e face a regime that denies and mocks the Holocaust while 
seeking the weapons to perpetrate one.  
     Evidentially, the traumatic memory of the Holocaust is being revived in the 
current crisis with Iran, also by Israel’s FM, indicating, in return, on its cultural 
traumatic nature.  
                                                 
41 Ynet.com, 13.11.06, Israel news; “Livni: Iran a threat to the world, we need to wake up” (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3327421,00.html 
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The Vice Premier  
With a political career lasting over sixty-six years and three terms as PM of Israel 
Shimon Peres is the most senior politician actively serving in Israel’s political 
sphere, currently today he is the ninth President of the State of Israel and in 2006 
(my frame of time for the analysis) he served as the vice premier (VP). 
Consequently, I perceive the construction of meaning by such a senior politician 
as crucial to describe the official political discourse concerning the “Iranian 
threat”. 
They think we have a bomb, let them think 
 1) On the closing day of the “Holocaust conference” in Teheran Israel’s VP 
mobilized the following statement in a symposium in Tel Aviv:42  
“We need to build up our power without threatening anyone. I'm in favor of 
ambiguity, I formulated it. They think we have a bomb, let them think… Iran's 
nuclear weapons are a problem of the world. Putin can say what he wants, for 
him nuclear weapons are a nightmare, as well as for others. I don’t believe 
the world will ignore it… Israel isn't alone. We need to launch a huge 
campaign against the ayatollahs. On this matter we need to attack this lunatic 
Ahmadinejad.”  
 
Following the constitutive narrative of power and renewal, the senior Zionist 
leader (Shimon Peres) constructs here the mythological narrative of the heroically 
‘new Jew’, in modern terms. Israel is presented as a new form of existence (‘a 
dignity sense of existence’) that will overcome the perpetrator (who ever he is). 
Israel’s relevant power, is suggested in the form of nuclear weaponry (They [Iran] 
think we [Israel] have a bomb, let them think), but unlike the dominant pessimistic 
mentality of siege, which views Israel as standing alone in a hostile world, the 
habitual tendency to construct meaning (as was portrayed up until now), the VP is 
constructing here a more optimistic perception (in Israeli perspective): Israel isn't 
alone.  
                                                 
42 Ynet.com, 13.12.06, Attila Somfalvi; “Peres: Israel should remain ambiguous on nukes” (accessed 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3339801,00.html  
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     Israel is presented here as a powerful nation with dominant position in the 
international arena. Dominant enough to mobilize an international action (to some 
sort) against Iran: a huge campaign against the ayatollahs. On this matter we need 
to attack this lunatic Ahmadinejad. 
Ahmadinejad is a Holocaust denier who wants a new Holocaust 
2) In a direct relation to the “Holocaust convention” in Teheran, one month before 
its occurrence (November 12, 2006), Israel’s VP mobilized the following 
statement to the media:43 
“Let them go to Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Treblinka and see which horrors the 
Jewish people went through. Ahmadinejad is a Holocaust denier who wants a 
new Holocaust and is calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.” 
      
The memory of the Holocaust is being framed, also by Israel’s VP, in 
contemporary frame of reference and in direct relation to the “Iranian threat”, 
indicating on its cultural traumatic nature. The victimhood of the Holocaust is 
presented in the shape of Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Treblinka (the most notorious 
concentration camps on European soil), and Iran is framed and associated, in this 
respect, not only as Holocaust denier but as a regional actor who wants a new 
Holocaust and is calling for the destruction of the Jewish state.  
     This section can coherently illustrate how the victimhood of the Holocaust is 
communicated in relation to Iran, while the previous section, by the VP, can 
illustrate how Israel’s position of power is constructed in relation to the threat.  
      
                                                 
43 Ynet.com, 12.11.06, Israel news; “Peres: Iran Holocaust convention is a convention of liars” (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3338585,00.html  
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The Opposition Leader  
 Benjamin Netanyahu is a former PM of Israel, currently the Chairman of the 
conservative Likud Party, and the official leader of the Opposition in the Knesset 
(the Israeli parliament). He is a dominant political figure in the Israeli political 
sphere, and a leading PM candidate in the next elections.  
     The discourse has been described, up until now, by collective agents that are 
major political actors in the current ruling political party (kadima), political figures 
that fulfilled crucial political positions (prime minister, minister of foreign affairs 
and vice premier) at the frame time of my investigation. Does different frames 
(concerning the Iranian issue) are constructed by the opposition leader? Or, is it 
the case that the same Holocaust-related-themes are being constructed also by the 
political opponent from the right. The answer can be already indicated by the next 
presented title.  
It's 1938 and Iran is Germany; Ahmadinejad is preparing another 
Holocaust 
I will open with two sets of quotes from a very metaphorical speech, by Israel’s 
current opposition leader, that was held at the same annual event of the UJC 
General Assembly, in LA, where both the PM and the FM attended and gave 
speeches:44 
* “It's 1938 and Iran is Germany. And Iran is racing to arm itself with atomic 
bombs… Believe him and stop him… This is what we must do. Everything else 
pales before this… he [Ahmadinejad] is preparing another Holocaust for the 
Jewish state.” 
 
* “No one cared then and no one seems to care now… There is still time. All 
ways must be considered. We can't let this thing happen… No one will defend 
the Jews if the Jews don't defend themselves… Iran's nuclear ambitions have 
to be stopped.” 
 
 
                                                 
44 Haaretz.com, 14.11.06, Peter Hirschberg; “Netanyahu: It's 1938 and Iran is Germany; Ahmadinejad is 




The first presented quote, by Israel’s current opposition leader, is “drawing a 
direct analogy between Iran and Nazi Germany” (as Haaretz Correspondent, Peter 
Hirschberg, defined it). Nazi Germany is associated here in contemporary frame of 
reference, indicating, in return, on the traumatic cultural nature of the memory of 
the Holocaust in Israel, and following the mentality of siege the high rank 
politician is mobilizing here an extremely pessimistic world view: he 
[Ahmadinejad] is preparing another Holocaust for the Jewish state.     
     In accordance with the PM negative perception of the world (as a reminder: 
[d]oomed are they who entertain the false illusion that they could… rely on the 
mercy of strangers), which is constituted in Israel’s sense of identity, also here we 
can witness the construction of a very gloomy perception. Israel is presented as 
standing alone in a hostile world: [n]o one cared then and no one seems to care 
now. The nations of the world are perceived as immoral and, following the 
mentality of siege, deep mistrust about the world intentions is well constructed 
here. According to the collective agent, the immorality of the 1940’Th is 
repeatedly appearing in present days, while another Holocaust for the Jewish state 
is being prepared; this time in the shape of a nuclear Holocaust.  
     However, in accordance with the presented discursive tendency up until now, 
and following the constitutive legacy of the Eichmann trial, also the opposition 
leader presents the victimhood of the previous Holocaust and the suggested new 
Holocaust for the Jewish state from a position of power and control. Israel is 
presented as a new form of existence that will not let this thing happen and use all 
means in its arsenal to make sure of it: [a]ll ways must be considered.  
     Indeed, a few days earlier, in an interview with a leading media figure (Razi 
Barkai), in Israel’s army radio45, when asked about Israel’s lack of ability to 
eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, by military means, the opposition leader, and 
former PM, mobilized the following comment:  
                                                 
45 Published at the same article (Haaretz.com, 14.11.06).    
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“I don't want to analyze the capability required to eliminate [the Iranian] 
threat, but this capability exists.”  
 
Back to the UJC speech, the constitutive slogan of the Holocaust, never-again 
(Jewish blood would never be abandoned or defenseless again), is of evidence also 
by the construction of meaning by Israel’s opposition leader: [w]e can't let this 
thing happen… Iran's nuclear ambitions have to be stopped. And consequently, 
sociocognitive implications of a mentality of siege (from such traumatic 
associations) well follow. Due to the legacy of the Holocaust, Israel is presented as 
standing alone in a hostile world, totally reliant upon its position of relevant 
power:  
No one will defend the Jews if the Jews don't defend themselves… Iran's 
nuclear ambitions have to be stopped. 
Iran President more dangerous than Hitler 
2) Four months before the “Holocaust convention” in Teheran (September 12, 
2006) the right-wing opposition leader (Netanyahu) mobilized the following 
message in an international counter terrorism conference held in Tel Aviv46.  
* “Hitler went out on a world campaign first, and then tried to get nuclear 
weapons. Iran is trying to get nuclear arms first. Therefore from that 
perspective, it is much more dangerous.”  
 
* “Hitler was defeated because he could not develop weapons of mass 
destruction. But Iran stands close to developing nuclear weapons. Does the 
world understand? ... The free world, when faced with fanatical ideologies, 
and when it understood the danger, eventually used its power to remove the 
danger. It won in the war against Nazism and communism in the Cold War. I 
believe that here too there will be a victory,” 
 
Yet again, the collective memory of the Holocaust is being revived by Israel’s 
opposition leader in contemporary frame of reference, indicating, in return, on the 
traumatic cultural nature of the memory of the Holocaust in Israel, and on the 
stability of political discourse. A straight forward analogy between Nazi Germany 
                                                 
46 Ynet.com, 12.09.06, Yaakov Lappin; “Bibi: Iran president more dangerous than Hitler” (accessed: 
08.06.2008) [online]. URL - http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3303129,00.html  
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and Iran is being constructed (Hitler went out on a world campaign first, and then 
tried to get nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to get nuclear arms first) and through 
much emphasis on materialistic factors (nuclear arms) the delegitimization of the 
adversary (Iran) is done here by presenting Iran as even more hazardous than Nazi 
Germany.  
     In the second quotation section, an ‘appeal’ to the world conscience is of 
evidence. After presenting Iran as a more hazardous danger to Jewish existence 
than what Hitler represented (due to the materialistic component of nuclear arms) 
an appeal to the world ‘beaten conscience’ is mobilized. In this respect, 
inconsistency in the collective agent construction of meaning can be identified. In 
contradiction with the previous presented speech (which has been mobilized to an 
American Jewish audience in a more advanced point of time; weeks before the 
“Holocaust convention” in Teheran), where the collective agent constructs a very 
clear discourse that is rooted in the mentality of siege: [n]o one will defend the 
Jews if the Jews don't defend themselves. In this communication, the collective 
agent constructs a much more ‘optimist’ discourse (in Israeli perspective). Unlike 
the conception of [n]o one will defend the Jews; a great deal of confidence is 
constructed here regarding the world compliance to remove the danger from Iran: 
It [the international community] won in the war against Nazism… I believe that 
here too there will be a victory. 
Summary 
Evidently, the traumatic memory of the Holocaust tends to revive in contemporary 
frame of references and in direct relation to the “Iranian threat”, validating, in 
return, my theoretic assumption concerning how the collective memory of the 
Holocaust operates in the Israeli political discourse as a cultural trauma. Through 
“speech act theory” (Alexander 2004, 11), the presented collective agents (four 
dominant political figures and one more Jewish clerk) communicated with their 
audience (the Israeli public) in a symbolic terminology, which implicitly or 
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explicitly relates to the traumatic event of the past (the Holocaust). By so doing, a 
well manipulated and mediated traumatic historic event (the Holocaust), which is 
already culturally constructed and established in Israel’s structure of meaning, 
seem to transform toward a “new master narrative” (Alexander 2004, 12), and 
enter into the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity. 
     From the presented theoretical assumption that political communication is best 
successful if it is mobilized by metaphors and narratives, which intimately relates 
to the audience cultural meanings, it is of evidence that the emotional magnitude 
of the presented communication is of the highest degree; the association of a 
contemporary event with the traumatic event of the Holocaust. In this respect, we 
can clearly see how political agents (collective agents) promote their frames to the 
media (in an assume attempt to mobilize political support for their cause) through 
cultural messages that appeal to the collectivity’s sense of its own identity 
(represented here by the collective memory of the Holocaust).  
     The presented political figures prompt their frames domestically; with an 
appeal to the public emotional magnitude, and internationally; with an ‘appeal’ to 
the world ‘beaten conscience’. The traumatic memory of the Holocaust, which is 
culturally constructed in Israel’s structure of meaning, is clearly instrumentalized 




This thesis has approached conflict analysis though focusing on the representation 
of Holocaust themes, in the Israeli political discourse, in relation to the 
international crisis with Iran. It has shown that the collective memory of the 
Holocaust has been associated with the Iranian issue to the largest extent, by all of 
the investigated political agents (the PM, the FM, the VP and the opposition 
leader). 
The Fixed Formation of the Discourse 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the traumatic memory of the Holocaust gains a 
prominent place in the contemporary political discourse in Israel. As was shown in 
chapter four, the collective memory of the Holocaust is deeply rooted in Israel’s 
“area of objectivised culture” (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995, p.127). And due to 
the nature of the past experience of the Holocaust, the threat of total extinction (by 
Israel’s regional enemies) was considered as a realistic probability in 
circumstances of the extreme (Shapira 1997, p.94); a realist probability of 
extinction, that intensifies through the traditional tendency of Israeli collective 
agents to reconstruct the trauma claim of the Holocaust and to associate it to 
contemporary threats. 
The Cultural Trauma 
As was shown in the theoretical chapter (chapter two), the capacity of a memory 
to reconstruct itself in contemporary “frame of reference” (Assmann and 
Czaplicka 1995, p.130) indicates on its cultural origin, and when the cultural 
origin of the memory is rooted in “horrendous event” (Alexander 2004, p.1), not 
only that this event will be highly representative, in society’s sense of collectively, 
it will also tend to be associated with contemporary threats. Constructing it, in 
 95
return, as a “cultural trauma” (Alexander 2004). Accordingly, correlating with the 
theorization of cultural trauma, the analysis has shown that the traumatic memory 
of the Holocaust most evidently represented and associated, in the political 
discourse, with the current crisis with Iran, symbolizing it, in return, as a 
fundamental threat to society’s existence.  
     Consequently, I would like to argue that Zertal’s (2005) characterization that: 
“Auschwitz – as the embodiment of the total, ultimate evil – was, and still is, 
summoned up for military and security issues and political dilemmas … thus 
transmuting Israel into an ahistorical and apolitical twilight zone, where 
Auschwitz is not a past event but a threatening present and a constant option” 
(pp.3-4), is well validated in relation to the current security issue with Iran. The 
presented political figures clearly associated the traumatic event of the Holocaust 
with the Iranian issue, validating my assumption concerning the cultural traumatic 
nature of the memory of the Holocaust, in Israel’s sense of identity.    
The Destructive Potential of Symbolic Interaction 
Following the presented theoretical settings, which guided me throughout the 
thesis, it was shown, in the analysis chapters, that through “speech act theory” 
(Alexander 2004, 11) collective Israeli agents are communicating with their 
audience (members of the carrier group) in a symbolic terminology, which 
implicitly and explicitly relates to the traumatic memory of the Holocaust. By so 
doing, the well mediated traumatic event of the Holocaust, which is already 
culturally constructed and established in society’s structure of meaning, is 
transforming the contemporary political event to an existential threat that, 
following Alexander’s (2004) theorization of the “cultural trauma”, enters “into 
the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity” (pp.10-12).  
     In accordance with Kaufmann’s (2001) theorization of the “myth-symbol 
complex”, it is of clear evidence that the presented political figures communicates 
through emotional expression, and due to the investigated frame of time, this 
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tendency might be assumed as a respond to the most emotionally potent symbol 
evoked - Iran’s “Holocaust convention”. Iran is presented through emotional 
expression and portrayed as an existential threat to Jewish existent. Consequently, 
to my opinion, the findings are implying on the destructive influence that ‘identity 
issues’ play in the communication between the two actors; they are implying on 
how hostile identities might escalate an already escalated SD; and they are 
implying on how hostile myths might stimulate fear of group extinction, in the 
incited state.  
     In sum, chapters four, five and six have shown the sort of nature of norms and 
identities that are originated in the Israeli domestic realm and, following the 
theorization that “[h]ostile and fear rise as a result of symbolic events that activate 
the myths, such as … a leader explicitly manipulating symbols” (Kaufmann’s 
2001, p.34), the discourse may well suggest that although that fear of group 
extinction (domestically in Israel) is constructed as a reaction to Iran’s atomic 
program, it is also constructed as a reaction to Iran’s  manipulation of Israel’s most 
intimate symbol: the Holocaust. In other words, the discourse indicates that 
Israel’s fears are intensifying in reaction to the symbolic event of the “Holocaust 
convention” (held in Tehran). Emphasizing, in return, to my opinion, the 
destructive nature that identity issues might play in the communication between 
the actors.     
The Materialistic Realization of the Threat 
In line with the presented “cutting edge of constructivist research” (Gourevitch 
2002, p.319), which emphasizes the nature of norms and identities but do not deny 
crucial materialistic patterns of behaviour that characterize much of the 
international politics scholarship (such as military abilities), we could see how 
both ‘ideological means’ (Iran’s calls to wipe the existence of the State of Israel off 
the map and its Holocaust denial) and ‘materialistic means’ (the catastrophic 
weapons to fulfill their goals) are incorporated in the Israeli political discourse.  
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     As was shown in the analysis chapters, materialistic patterns of behaviour 
(Iran’s nuclearization) were associated with identity-related issues (Iran’s 
Holocaust denial and anti-Zionist rhetoric’s). Iran’s communicated aspiration (to 
wipe the existence of the State of Israel off the map) was constructed, by all of the 
presented political figures, in materialistic terms and as a realistic threat to Israel’s 
existence. In other words, the codification of the “Iranian threat” was constructed 
by both materialistic and identity means, which associates Iran’s nuclear program 
with its communicated aspiration to wipe the existence of the State of Israel off the 
map.  
     This is the nature of norms and identities that is constructed in the presented 
political discourse; a collective sense of victimization that is rooted in the memory 
of the Holocaust and constructed, in contemporary frame of reference, as a 
realistic “existential threat”. The association of a contemporary “nuclear threat” 
with an existential historical experience of total extermination shows how the 
Holocaust operates as “cultural trauma” (Alexander 2004), in Israel’s domestic 
realm.  
The Holocaust Legacies 
The research question that has guided this thesis from beginning to end has been:  
How the Collective Memory of the Holocaust (in Israel) is being revived in the 
Current Crisis with Iran?   
     I showed above and concluded that the collective memory of the Holocaust 
revive in contemporary frame of reference – indicating on its cultural traumatic 
nature. Concerning the HOW, my interpretation showed that the collective 
memory of the Holocaust is being revived, in the political Israeli discourse, in 
tight accordance with constituting Holocaust legacies. 
     My findings described the habitual tendency to communicate the victimhood of 
the Holocaust from a position of power, sovereignty, and control. And under the 
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constitutive lesson of the Holocaust: Jewish blood would never be abandoned or 
defenseless again (never-again).  
     Through the “overlapping” of discourses, three repeating themes repeatedly 
appeared: Israel’s absolute victimhood, which was presented through the historical 
memory of the Holocaust. Israel’s position of relevant power, which was justified 
by the consequences of the Holocaust, and the ‘appeal’ to the world conscience, 
which through both of the victimhood and the renewal was instrumentally 
communicated in order mobilize the world into action against Iran.  
     Accordingly, in accordance with the traditional tendency of the past, the 
memory of the Holocaust is clearly being revived - in the Israeli political discourse 
- as a symbol for existential fears and the necessity to construct and maintain a 
strong military state.  
     Those were the hegemonic Holocaust discourses that with their fix dominant 
meanings appeared in the presented political discourse as cultural stories, which fit 
the available and familiar narratives of the Israeli society. We could see how the 
traditional tendency of Israeli politicians to produce, process, code, and put to use 
the “collective memory of death and trauma” (Zertal 2005, p.1) in Israel's public 
sphere (in periods of crises), is being authenticated in the current crisis with Iran.  
     The analysis chapters have shown a discursive tendency that constructed a very 
pessimistic world view. It was shown, in chapter four, that rooted in the long term 
history of the Diaspora and the short term history of Israel are sociocognitive 
emotional perceptions that results with high sensitivity to information, and deep 
mistrust about the world intentions. Accordingly, as was shown and interpreted, 
the information that comes from Teheran is constructed, in the Israeli political 
discourse, as evidence for reaffirming the already constitutive perception 
concerning the negative intentions of the world. As was shown, the voices which 
echo from Teheran are compared to no less then the incitement by the Nazi 
Regime, and furthermore; the historical appeasement with the Nazi communicated 
incitement, by all countries of the world, was associated with the world ‘passive’ 
 99
reaction to Iran’s communicated incitement. Those types of associations are 
indicating, to my opinion, on a discursive tendency that is validating the 
perception of Israel’s mentality in terms of “siege mentality” (Bar – Tal & 
Teichman 2005); a mentality of siege which might well point on the accuracy of 
Zertal’s (2005) sociocognitive characterization of the Israeli culture as “Culture of 
Death”. 
The Need for Future Research 
The presented above emphasizes, to my opinion, the need to investigate the 
destructive communication in the ME, and its affect on the Israeli society; a 
society that its political representatives tend to associate contemporary threats with 
no less than the traumatic event of the Holocaust, implying, in return, on a very 
hectic sociocognitive state-of-mind.  
     This thesis was descriptive by nature, describing and interpreting a political 
discourse. Future research, on the theme of the collective memory of the 
Holocaust and its revival in periods of crises, can try to generalize, for example, 
how the presented discursive tendency, by Israeli collective agents, is being 
codified in the Israeli public sphere. 
     Does the tendency to associate the Holocaust with contemporary threats 
construct “existential fears” in the Israeli public sphere? If so, do existential fears 
rise as a result of symbolic events that activate the myths, such as Iran’s explicit 
manipulation of the memory of the Holocaust? 
     Does the memory of the Holocaust still works as an excuse, in the Israeli public 
sphere, for Israel’s position of power and as an argument for its necessity to 
construct and maintain a strong military state?  
     Can a more sympathetic attitude, by regional Muslim actors, to the Jewish 
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